

**Reform through Initiative:
A Campaign Plan to Legalize Marijuana through Popular
Initiative in Washington State**

By: Justin Hayes

jhayes51@ufl.edu

MASTER'S PROJECT IN LIEU OF THESIS

PART I: Literature Review, APA Stylebook

PART II: Campaign Plan, Chicago Manual of Style, Endnotes

PART I

LITERATURE REVIEW

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Chapter 1

Introduction: Laying the Groundwork

On November 2, 2010, California voters rejected Proposition 19, a ballot initiative that “would have allowed possession of small amounts of marijuana for personal use, and given cities and counties the power to regulate and tax commercial marijuana sales” (Faryon, 2010). As Election Day drew closer, the initiative’s initial popularity began to decline, which seems to be counter-intuitive given the upward trend in support nation-wide. According to the Pew Research Center (2010), national support for marijuana legalization grew substantially between 1990 and 2010, from 16 percent in favor to 41 percent, respectively. Furthermore, support for legalization grew to 45 percent in 2011 (Pew Research Center, 2011). The upward trend in public support for legalization has spurred a push by more proponents to reform marijuana policy in their states. This recent drive for marijuana legalization in various states across the country serves as the backdrop and inspiration for the development of this project. Specifically, this project will develop a hypothetical campaign plan for a ballot initiative that proposes the legalization of marijuana.

Case Study: What Happened in California?

Before outlining the specifics of the campaign plan for this project, this paper will briefly examine why Proposition 19 failed in the 2010 California midterm election. This examination will provide a context for studying direct democracy campaigns and developing a successful campaign plan. If Proposition 19 passed in 2010, it would have allowed “adults 21 and older to possess and grow small amounts of marijuana” and it would have allowed “cities and counties to authorize commercial production and retail sales” (Hoeffel, 2010). On September 29, 2010, the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) (2010a) conducted a poll finding that, “[a]mong California’s likely voters, 52 percent favor the proposition to legalize marijuana” compared to 41 percent against and 7 percent undecided. Then on October 20, 2010, less than a month later,

another poll conducted by the PPIC (2010b) found that “44 percent of likely voters plan to vote for Proposition 19 [...] while 49 percent plan to vote against it, with 7 percent undecided.” While support was already low for Republicans in both polls, support for the measure declined among Democrats, although a solid majority supported it in both polls, and steeply among Independents, who went from 65 percent supporting in September to 40 percent in October (PPIC, 2010b). This downward trend in support continued and the initiative was defeated.

In the summer of 2010, political leaders in California were optimistic about the prospects of Proposition 19, at least for its ability to get people excited about the election. The measure received high profile endorsements from multiple Republican and Democratic members of the House of Representatives from California, the Young Democrats of California, the Republican Liberty Caucus of California, and many other interest groups, politicians and organizations (Grim, 2010; West, 2010). Although the California Democratic Party did not directly endorse Proposition 19 in California during the 2010 midterm elections, the chair of the California Democratic Party John Burton told the *San Francisco Chronicle* in April that he thought the initiative “will turn out people” to the polls (Marinucci, 2010). In the 2010 primaries, it seemed like there was a lot of excitement surrounding the prospects of the initiative. For instance, one precinct inspector reported voters were coming to the polls specifically to vote on the marijuana ballot initiative only to find out it was not going to appear on the ballot until the November election (Russ, 2010). Throughout the whole campaign, according to the National Institute on Money in State Politics (2010), groups supporting Proposition 19 raised over \$4.6 million compared to only around \$365,000 by opposition groups. This excitement, however, did not translate to votes on Election Day.

What explains this sharp decline in support within the period of less than a month? According to Mark DiCamillo, a pollster for the Field Poll, declining support in the polls occurred because “U.S. [Attorney General] Eric Holder’s promise to enforce federal drug laws no matter what California voters did was persuasive” (Hoeffel, 2010). DiCamillo told the *Los Angeles Times* that he believed voters just did not think that legalizing marijuana “was realistic” after Holder made that statement (Hoeffel, 2010). After closer examination of the PPIC (2010a) survey from September, it appears that “65 percent of who plan[ed] to vote no [said] the outcome [was] very important, compared to 42 of likely voters who plan[ed] to vote yes.” From the results of this question, it is possible to surmise that voters who were likely to vote yes were not as concerned about the results of the measure and, perhaps, easier to persuade about their final decision on Election Day. This could explain why Holder’s statement might have made some voters change their minds.

For this project, I conducted an interview with Mark Cooke, Policy Advocate with the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington State, which helped with the Initiative 502 campaign to legalize marijuana in Washington in 2012.¹ Cooke suggests two other possible reasons for the failure of Proposition 19. One reason for the failure, according to Cooke, was the fact that “they ran [Proposition 19] in a non-presidential election year,” arguing that voter turnout is less than in presidential election cycles (personal communication, November 29, 2012). Historically, midterm elections have had “substantially lower turnout” (Wattenburg and Brians, 2002, p. 408). Although California had turnout rates above the median in 2010, its turnout still did not reach recent presidential year levels (McDonald, 2011). After studying the 1994 and 1998 midterm elections, Wattenburg and Brians (2002) concluded that turnout in

¹ Full interview available in the Appendix

midterm elections favors Republicans given their findings that registered nonvoters in midterm elections are more likely to support Democrats. The results of the PPIC (2010b) survey showed a majority of Democrats still favored Proposition 19 leading up to the election, which could lead to the conclusion that the low turnout midterm election prevented its passage.

However, although Republicans gained 63 seats in the House of Representatives in the 2010 midterm election, including gains in traditionally “blue states” like Washington and New York, Republicans netted no House of Representative seats in California while Democratic candidates actually picked up seats in the California State Assembly (PPIC, 2010c). Does this mean that Democratic turnout was not a factor in Proposition 19’s defeat? While turnout among Democrats might not have been a problem for Proposition 19, mixed support among high-profile members of the Democratic Party and Democratic politicians splitting the Democratic vote over support of the initiative might have prevented effective partisan heuristic cues with regards to voting on the initiative. For instance, despite the fact that Democratic House members from California supported the measure, prominent California Democratic Senator Diane Feinstein opposed Proposition 19, arguing that the measure was “a jumbled legal nightmare that [would] make our highways, our workplaces and our communities less safe” (Hoeffel, 2010a). At the same time, Republican and Democratic candidates for Senate and California Governor in 2010 opposed Proposition 19, (Silver, 2010). It is possible that the lack of strong cues in favor of the initiative from the major Democratic candidates led to many “no” votes among Democrats. In the literature review, it will be necessary to examine the impact of heuristic cues on voters in ballot initiative races.

Cooke also argues that midterm elections like 2010 also have “a lower turnout for young people, and young people are some of the biggest supporters of marijuana law reform.” Indeed,

Highton and Wolfinger (2001) argue that turnout is low among young people because “engagement with politics and its consequences, like voting, are more costly for those who have not yet sorted out their lives” (p. 203). Donovan, Tolbert and Smith (2009) argue that midterm elections are “low-stimulus elections” with higher “information costs” due to less coverage by the news media and less excitement (pp. 100-101). While Donovan et al. (2009) find that ballot initiatives can increase engagement among what they call “peripheral voters,” or voters who “are motivated to go to the polls as a result of lower information costs associated with a high-stimulus presidential election,” during midterm elections, there still is the problem of lower turnout among young people in general.

Furthermore, Cooke contends that another reason for the failure of Proposition 19 has to do with the language of the initiative itself. Cooke said the idea that marijuana would be regulated on the local level was viewed by some “as being problematic in that it was just going to be so confusing about who could do what and where.” This certainly could be a driving factor in the initiatives defeat given the vagueness of the regulations. In fact, a recent poll by Rasmussen (2012) confirms this suspicion that voters want to be clear that there will be some coherent plan to regulate marijuana. When the survey asks:

Americans simply whether they favor legalization of marijuana, 45 percent say yes and 45 percent say no. But when we ask about legalizing and regulating marijuana in a similar manner to the way alcohol and cigarettes are regulated, support for legalization increases to 56 percent. Only 36 percent remain opposed. (Rasmussen, 2012)

Clearly, this seems to be a factor in whether or not citizens will support marijuana legalization efforts. Furthermore, this poll provides an important insight into how to frame campaign messages to get the most support from voters.

Analyzing the results of the 2010 election for Proposition 19 provides some very significant insights into running a ballot initiative campaign. The campaign with the most money does not always win, and given the huge influx of cash to groups supporting the measure, clearly there is some other driving factor behind the initiative's defeat. Given the steep decline in support in opinion polls from September to October, it appears that the more voters learned about the initiative, the less they supported it. This could be a result of the Attorney General's claim that the federal government would still enforce federal drug policy against users or it could be that they found out more about how marijuana would be regulated under the proposed legal language in the initiative. Finally, higher turnout, especially among younger voters, appears to be a key factor in winning an initiative race dealing with marijuana legalization. Also because there were high-profile endorsements and opposition to the initiative from members of both parties, it appears that the parties might have played some role in the process. Therefore, finding academic literature revolving around the issues of turnout, elite influence and framing will be important for developing a comprehensive campaign plan for this issue. The evaluation of this ballot initiative race has become essential to the development of the campaign plan of this project.

The Project Plan

On November 6, 2012, voters in Washington state and Colorado voted to legalize and regulate the sale, possession and distribution of marijuana for recreational use (Coffman and Neroulis, 2012). This project sets the clocks back to 2011 and starts from scratch to show how to develop a campaign plan for successfully passing a hypothetical marijuana ballot initiative in Washington State for the 2012 election cycle. This plan covers everything from the initial filing and signature gathering process to the final get-out-the-vote and voter contact plans. This project

uses a mixture of academic research, opinion polls, professional sources and news articles to develop the campaign plan for this ballot measure.

Before developing a campaign plan, the researcher has compiled a literature review examining the academic research surrounding direct democracy. Specifically, this literature review covers the role that direct democracy campaigns play in U.S. elections. The scholarship examined will include, but is not limited to the agenda-setting and priming effects of direct democracy, how direct democracy affects voter turnout, how to increase turnout among select demographics, how the major political parties become involved in direct democracy campaigns, how voters determine their vote on ballot initiatives, how ballot issues are framed, and how to develop effective campaign messages. While this research likely does not cover all aspects of developing a campaign plan, having a solid understanding of the existing research will provide a point from which to start to think about direct democracy campaigns. This project also includes a brief section about certain legal considerations before developing a marijuana policy initiative.

Furthermore, this literature review will discuss how a campaign might approach targeting specific groups. A 2011 poll by the Pew Research Center found that a majority (53 percent) of Democrats surveyed supported marijuana legalization, a plurality of independents (49 percent) supported the issue, a majority of those aged 18 to 29 (54 percent) and a plurality of men (48 percent). A majority (52 percent) of women surveyed opposed legalization and strong majority (66 percent) of those 65 and older opposed legalization. A plurality (48 percent) among those between 30 and 49 supported legalization. While these results are based on a nationwide survey rather than a Washington-specific survey, the campaign will use this as a baseline from which to conduct further investigations of Washington voters throughout the campaign. However, from this poll, Democrats and young people will serve as targeted likely voters, or those voters who

the campaign will target in get-out-the-vote efforts. On the other hand, independents and middle-aged women will be considered persuadable voters, or voters whose attitudes the campaign will attempt to change through its message development.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Although the use of direct democracy is not a new phenomenon, academic scholarship devoted to studying this process has only appeared in recent decades, most of which comes from the last 10 to 15 years. However, one of the seminal works surrounding this process comes from David Magelby's 1984 book, *Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Proposition in the United States*. Although many of his claims have been challenged in recent scholarship, this book serves as an important baseline from which to research the process. In this literature review, the research of Magelby (1984) and later academic investigations into the role that direct democracy plays in U.S. elections will be examined. This literature review will serve as a way to develop theoretical insights and practical lessons for those interested in the process. Additionally, it will create a foundation for which this project can develop its own direct democracy campaign.

What is Direct Democracy?

Direct democracy campaigns can take two forms: referendums and popular initiatives. Referendums allow "citizens to approve or reject laws or constitutional amendments proposed by the government" while initiatives occur when citizens "propose new laws or constitutional amendments by petition" (Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004, p. 465). In order to get an initiative on the ballot, the organizations sponsoring the initiatives must gather signatures from between two to 15 percent of registered voters (Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004). This project deals with a ballot initiative rather than a referendum, given that it will be proposed by a group rather than the government. Before analyzing the specific aspects of direct democracy campaigns, this paper will briefly examine the purpose of direct democracy campaigns.

According to Magelby (1984), the progressive movement at the beginning of the twentieth century supported direct democracy to "ensure that public officials remained accountable to voters" (p. 21). While progressives did not view direct democracy as a way to

replace representative government, they believed it would “complement a more open process for choosing representatives” (Magelby, 1984, p. 23). Advocates of direct democracy also saw the process “as an alternative to legislative unresponsiveness” as well as a “means to protest specific policy grievances, and to implement on a collective basis those programs deemed desirable by the majority” (Bone and Benedict, 1975, p. 331). According to Schmidt (1989), proponents viewed it as “a safeguard against the concentration of political power in the hands of a few, and it provides a means of putting new ideas on the political agenda” (p. 25-26). Furthermore, Schmidt (1989) argues that direct democracy was designed to prevent “any monopoly on political power, even when an individual or party controls the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government” (p. 29). Progressive reformers saw direct democracy as a tool designed to allow outside organizations without partisan interests to enter the election process while limiting the role of traditional parties (D. Smith, 2005). Later, this paper will discuss research that rejects the idea that parties do not become involved in the process.

Theoretically, direct democracy is a way for voters to bypass the traditional political process and directly influence the policies of the government. In the case of ballot initiatives, specifically, citizens or outside groups have control of the language and legal implications of the laws placed on the ballot for popular vote. For the remainder of this literature review, this paper will discuss the effects of this process on elections when it comes to how citizens decide ballot initiatives, how campaign messages are developed and how other groups become involved in the process. While examining the theoretical and empirical research devoted to this topic, this review will also suggest how this scholarship relates to practical ballot initiative campaigns as well as the campaign plan being developed for this project.

Message Development in Ballot Measure Campaigns

Information Processing

Petty, Brinol and Priester (2009) argue that in order to measure the success of messages, one must observe “whether the transmitted communications are effective in changing the attitudes of the recipients in the desired direction” and “whether these modified attitudes in turn influence people’s behaviors” (p. 125). In the case of this campaign, the goal is to change targeted voters’ attitudes about the benefits of marijuana legalization (persuadable likely voters like middle-aged women) as well as their attitudes about whether or not to vote on this issue (younger voters). In terms of behavior, the goal of this campaign is to make sure these voters show up to the polls. When developing a message that targets a particular audience, it is important to understand how that audience processes information.

Two prominent theories address information processing when it comes to persuasive messages: the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) and the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM). According to Hallahan (2000), “highly motivated individuals process information effortfully (ELM) or systematically (HSM), whereas individuals with low motivation rely on cognitive shortcuts referred to as peripheral cues (ELM) or heuristics (HSM)” (pp. 465-466). In the ELM, processing can occur through the central route and/or the peripheral route. In the central route, people “carefully appraise the extent to which the communication provides information that is fundamental or central to the perceived merits of the position advocated” (Petty et al., 2009, p. 132). Audiences who process information through the peripheral route rely upon “simple cues” such as the emotional mood of the message or the source of the message to judge the merits of the advocated position (p. 135). Petty et al. (2009) argues that both routes can be effective, depending upon the level of involvement of the targeted audience. Overall, this model posits that

a higher “perceived personal relevance of a message” (p. 136), the use of a trustworthy source, the use of questions rather than assertions, the use of multiple sources, and showing that many people support a particular attitude or position can all have a greater impact on the effect of a particular message. The role of heuristics will be discussed later.

In order to influence behavioral change, Petty et al. (2009) argue that the theories of reasoned action and planned behavior serve as useful tools to determine whether or not someone will be influenced to engage in a particular behavior. The authors contend that “people are hypothesized to form intentions to perform or not perform behaviors, and these intentions are based on the person’s attitude toward the behavior as well as perceptions of the opinions of significant others (norms)” (p. 151). In other words, individuals should engage in a particular behavior if they have a positive attitude toward the behavior and perceive it to be socially desirable. Furthermore, this framework suggests that people weigh “the personal costs and benefits of engaging in a behavior” while factoring in their perceived “ability to control the behavior” (p. 150). Glasford (2008) applied the theory of reasoned action and theory of planned behavior to predicting voting among young adults. She concluded that young people will be more likely to vote “if they perceive that they have the ability to vote, the information needed to vote, and are socially motivated to vote (i.e., if they perceive that there is social support from significant others for voting)” (Glasford, 2008, p. 2666). For groups like young people, who already overwhelmingly support marijuana legalization, it is important that messages directed at this group attempt to increase positive attitudes toward voting, show that this behavior is socially desirable among young people, stress the low cost of voting and emphasize self-efficacy.

Source-Cues and Persuasion

How audiences process information and how that information influences their attitudes and behaviors depends largely on the source of that information. Andreoli and Worchel (1978) developed an experimental design in which they exposed subjects to an issue-related message delivered by a candidate, a representative, a former representative and a newscaster. The authors found a strong positive relationship between the perceived trustworthiness of a source and the ability of that source to persuade or change attitudes. According to McCroskey and Teven (1999), scholars have generally agreed upon two dimension of source credibility: “competence (qualification, expertness, intelligence, authoritativeness)” and “trustworthiness (character, sagacity, safety, honesty)” (p. 90). McCroskey and Teven (1999) also argue that the perceived intent of the source toward the audience, or “goodwill,” constitutes a third dimension of how audiences view the credibility of sources. Three elements of the goodwill dimension are “understanding, empathy, and responsiveness” (p. 92). It is important to recognize that the perceived credibility depends on how the receiver of the message views the source’s competence, trustworthiness and goodwill rather than an objective standard of credibility (Perloff, 2010).

Audiences might also perceive sources as credible if they find similarity with the communicator. In discussing social learning theory in the context of health communication, Slater (1999) observes that “behaviors are positively and visibly reinforced” (p. 342) when a particular communicator or model shares similar characteristics with the audience member. Studies on the effects of source and audience similarity have been researched, particularly in the field of psychology, for a long time. Indeed, Mills and Jellison (1968) found that “a communicator will be more persuasive when the audience thinks [the communicator] felt similar

to the audience he addressed than when they think he felt dissimilar to those he addressed” (p. 155). A seminal study by Bersheid (1966), however, found that similarity alone does not lead to attitude change, but that a “communicator whose similarity is relevant to the communication he delivers appears to cause a person to change his own position so as to make it more similar to that of the referent” (p. 676). However, as Goethals and Nelson (1973) suggest, similarity among communicators and audience members generally has more persuasive effects when dealing with emotional or value-based messages rather than issues of verifiable fact, in which people who are dissimilar might be more persuasive.

Framing

Not only is the process by which voters evaluate certain messages important to how they shape their attitudes, but the actual frames through which these messages are presented also play a role in how they influence voters. When discussing this concept, many scholars focus on the use of frames in mass media. When the media frames issues, Entman (1993) argues, they generally

define problems – determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; *diagnose causes* – identify the forces creating the problem; *make moral judgments* – evaluate causal agents and their effects; and *suggest remedies* – offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects. (p. 52)

In other words, framing messages involves the presentation of issues in ways that explain what problems surround those issues, what caused those problems and how to fix those problems. Furthermore, Brewer (2002) argues that “citizens can rely on the frames they receive from the mass media in deciding which value or values to connect to specific issues” (p. 304). Framing

deals not only with how issues are evaluated, but it also provides explanations for how audiences determine whether issues are salient (Entman, 1993; Brewer, 2002). Entman (1993) argues that news coverage can increase the salience of issues “by placement or repetition of by associating them with culturally familiar symbols (p. 53). These frames can become extremely important during campaigns and elections, when voters are required to evaluate a host of issues to make decisions on Election Day.

Scholars (Lau, Smith and Fiske, 1991; Haider-Markel and Joslyn, 2001) have argued that voters do not passively accept the frames they receive from communicators and that the effectiveness of frames depend on individual interpretations. Indeed, Lau, Smith and Fiske (1991) found that the persuasive effects of policy interpretations greatly depend not only on the accessibility of a policy frame, but how that interpretation aligns with a voter’s own political beliefs. Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001) argue that because people have attachments to certain “political predispositions that serve as critical intervening variables between opinion and information,” often “[w]hat is an accessible consideration to one individual may not be to another, even though both may be exposed to the same information frame” (p. 522). For instance, the authors examined issue frames and gun control. Specifically, they looked at a rights or freedom-based frame for gun-rights advocates versus a safety frame used by gun-control advocates. They found that the frame used to attribute blame for gun violence “were especially effective in reinforcing existing partisan beliefs of cause and effect,” but did little to change political predispositions about the causes of gun violence. (p. 537). In other words, the frames strengthened existing partisan biases about the causes of gun violence.

The study mentioned above has relevance to a ballot initiative about legalization marijuana given that there are likely two frames through which this issue will be discussed. One

frame will likely mirror the above mentioned freedom-based or individual rights-based frame. In other words, the proponents could argue that people should be free to do what they want as long as they are not violating the rights of others. Opponents could argue that there does not exist an individual right to get high or use marijuana. The second frame will likely revolve around the idea of safety. For instance, opponents could argue that legal marijuana would lead to widespread use, that there would be more criminal activity, that marijuana could act as a gateway drug and that there could be more cases of people driving under the influence of drugs, all of which threaten public safety. Proponents, however, could also use a safety frame, through which they argue that legal marijuana keeps it out of the black market and out of the hands of criminals to use as a source of revenue. These, of course, are not all of the uses, but are the researcher's own suggested frames. However, there emerges a predominant theme of liberty v. safety for this particular issue, which has been analyzed in previous research.

A 2004 study examined the beliefs of Americans regarding the trade-off of civil liberties for security in the context of preventing terrorism. First, the authors found that African-Americans, young people between the ages of 18 and 24, urban residents and college graduates all expressed "higher than average levels of support for civil liberties" (Davis and Silver, 2004, p. 34). When it comes to ideology, the authors found that "liberals are more likely than conservatives to favor maintaining civil liberties over personal security and order" because "liberals possess great concern for the protection of individual rights while political conservatives have given greater priority to maintaining social order and the interests of the community as a whole" (p. 37). Although this study deals with counter-terrorism, this underlying belief could help explain why Democrats, who are traditionally more liberal, show stronger support for legalizing marijuana than Republicans.

However, Davis and Silver (2004) do point out that as one's perceived level of threat increases, his or her willingness to sacrifice liberty for security increases regardless of ideological leanings. This may or may not only apply to national security or terrorism, but if an opposing frame can create a perceived threat, it could potentially decrease support. In the 2010 California mid-term election, as discussed earlier, opposition groups highlighted the potential regulatory nightmare that might occur if Proposition 19 passed. The perceived threat of an unclear regulatory scheme might have primed many voters to draw upon a law and order or safety frame, even among liberal supporters. Or, it could have activated another political predisposition through which voters interpreted the issue. Regardless, this frame appears to have been effective in changing the attitudes and behaviors of some California mid-term voters.

It is important to point out that frames dealing with liberty or abstract appeals to individual rights might not always be effective. Smith and Herrington (2000) examine a controversial 1996 Colorado ballot initiative that would have added "the right of parents to 'direct and control the upbringing, education, values, and discipline of their children'" to the state constitution (p. 179). Despite public support for the initiative above 75 percent leading up to Election Day, the initiative was solidly defeated "by a convincing margin, 58% to 42%" (p. 180). One of the main reasons for the initiative's defeat, the authors contend, was the way in which the measure was "rhetorically framed" (p. 181). The proponents of the initiative made four major arguments, all revolving around the idea that "the voters of Colorado would have ensured that the educational, legal, political, and medical systems could not" infringe upon "the right of parents to direct and control the upbringing of their children" (p. 187). None of their arguments dealt with "the potential outcomes that might have resulted from the measure" and instead dealt

with “abstract rights” (p. 187). In other words, supporters of the initiative failed to discuss how protecting the rights of parents would lead to better outcomes for children in the state.

Research conducted by opposing groups found that, although there was overwhelming support of the idea behind the amendment, “68% said they worried the amendment offered no protection to children who lived in abusive families” (Smith and Herrington, 2000, p. 185). Using the fear that child abuse would be a potential outcome of this amendment, an opposition group called the Protect Our Children Coalition (POCC) ran a television advertisement nine days before the election “depicting a crying boy, who had obviously been physically abused, as a male voice could be heard screaming at him in the background” (p. 185). Over the screams of the boy, “the announcer said, ‘Protect our children. Vote ‘No’ on 17.’” (p. 185). Conversely, supporters and opponents of the PRA, Smith and Herrington (2000) found, scoffed at the single paid advertising effort of the PRA proponents due to its lack of any substance. Entman’s (1993) contention that message frames should predict the potential effects of a particular policy effort seems to hold true in the case of why the PRA failed. This case also serves as an example of when peripheral routes, such as the emotional nature of the POCC’s ad, can be very effective in campaigns.

On the other hand, Ferraiolo (2009) investigates a successful use of framing in her study of Proposition 215 in California and Question 2 in Maine, two medical marijuana ballot measures. Ferraiolo (2009) found that the “financial resources and advertising capacity” shaped “the content and deployment of issue frames” in both campaigns (p. 356). Proponents of the medical marijuana initiatives had access to more cash and more ways to get their message through the media, which “enabled them to develop made-for-television campaign storylines around themes of treatment options and compassion, while opponents’ shortage of funds forced

them to select themes” appealing to “fears about rampant drug use” that might have been more appropriate “in position papers and ballot pamphlet statements” (p. 356). In this case, it appeared that frames involving the personal relevance of medicinal marijuana use appealed more to voters than the fear appeals of law enforcement officials.

Source credibility was also an important factor in the framing of these messages. While the opponents used law enforcement groups as spokespersons for why the passage of these amendments would be bad, proponents sought and gained endorsements from the medical community, which allowed them “to position medical marijuana as an issue that average voters could relate to rather than a fringe movement, and allowed them to harness a favorable public opinion environment in which many voters claimed to be familiar with the drug and its medical uses” (Ferraiolo, 2009, p. 359). Ferraiolo argues that campaigns “will benefit from relying more heavily on spokespersons who lend an aura of sympathy, credibility, and legitimacy, while advocated with more disinterested, dispassionate, or complacent campaign representatives will struggle to impart their message to wide audiences” (p. 363). While members of the medical community might have been the most successful spokespersons for this particular campaign, it may in fact be law enforcement officials who serve as the most credible and legitimate spokespersons for marijuana legalization ballot initiative campaigns, given their first-hand experience with enforcing drug policy.

Voting, Turnout and Direct Democracy Campaigns

Do Direct Democracy Campaigns Increase Turnout?

Many scholars have sought to understand the relationship between direct democracy campaigns and voter turnout. The hope of direct democracy advocates is that this process would increase participation among the electorate (Schmidt, 1989). Relying upon surveys and voting

statistics from California, Colorado and Washington, three states with common use of direct democracy, Magelby (1984) finds no evidence “for the claim that initiatives will increase voter turnout over time” (p. 98). To explain his findings, Magelby (1984) also argues that voters “appear to see proposition campaigns as they see most matters of government: they pay only limited attention, leaving to the activists and other attentive members of the public the task of closely monitoring politics” (p. 127). Recently, however, scholars have used more sophisticated methods, allowing them to control for independent variables that might also affect turnout (D. Smith, 2005), and have shown that there are, indeed, effects on turnout when direct democracy campaigns are present.

Mark Smith (2001; 2005) examines the relationship between highly salient ballot measures and state-level voter turnout produces a better strategy for determining if direct democracy influences turnout and participation (p. 36). Smith (2001; 2005) determines the salience of ballot measures by performing a content analysis of front-page stories to see how much coverage a particular initiative has received. Smith (2001) finds that highly salient increase voter turnout in midterm elections between 1972 and 1996, but little to no effect in presidential races. Smith (2005) adds that increased turnout in direct democracy campaigns can also be seen in primary and off-year elections between 1971 and 1997, but again still finds no evidence of effects in presidential years.

On the other hand, both Tolbert, Grummel and Smith (2001) and Smith and Tolbert (2004) measure salience by examining “the number of initiatives on the ballot each election” in a particular state. Tolbert et al. (2001) find a 10 percent gap in turnout between states with the initiative and states without the initiative in midterm elections between 1970 and 1994. Contrary to the contention of Mark Smith (2001;2005) that there are no differences in presidential races,

Tolbert et al. (2001) also find a 5 percent difference in turnout in presidential elections between 1972 and 1996 between states with the initiative and those without it. Smith and Tolbert (2004) find increases in turnout of half a percentage point in presidential races and 1.2 percentage points during midterm elections between 1972 and 2002 with “each additional initiative on the ballot” (p. 40-42). Furthermore, using ANES data from 1996, 1998 and 2000, Smith and Tolbert (2004) find that “respondents living in states with frequent ballot initiatives were more likely to vote in the 1992 and 1996 presidential and 1998 midterm election but not in the 2000 presidential election” (p. 47). When it comes to presidential races, the authors qualify that the effects of direct democracy are greater “in noncompetitive, low-turnout” races (pp. 47-48). A more in depth study of the political environment for 2012 in the campaign plan should reveal whether this election will be competitive in Washington.

Finally, Biggers (2011) argues that the “issue content” of ballot initiatives should not be ignored when trying to determine turnout effects (p. 4). According to Biggers (2011), because social issues “draw on attitudes rooted in religious identity, are highly salient, and tap into existing social cleavages,” measuring their presence on ballots during elections should provide greater insights into the effects of initiatives on turnout (p. 4). The author finds that the presence of social issues on the ballot can have a greater effect on turnout in midterm and presidential elections than merely looking at the presence of many ballot initiatives. While marijuana legalization may not technically be a social issue, it will be important to not only conduct polls to measure what people think about this issue, but also measure how strong those opinions are. Each of the studies mentioned above use a variety of measures and methods to determine salience, and as the models become more sophisticated, empirical evidence seems to indicate that

direct democracy can increase turnout. However, these findings present the question: among whom do direct democracy campaigns increase turnout?

Engagement of Peripheral Voters

Peripheral voters, according to Donovan, Tolbert and Smith (2009), include independents and the less educated who vote in high-profile elections, such as presidential elections, due to the low “cost of obtaining information” (p. 101). Donovan et al. (2009) hypothesize that these voters will be mobilized by salient ballot measures during midterm elections due to increased coverage and campaigning surrounding these propositions. Not only did the authors find increased awareness of ballot measures in midterm elections among peripheral voters, but the authors found that these voters were more engaged by ballot measures than partisans (p. 115). Tolbert, Bowen and Donovan (2009) also find greater mobilization and turnout among low-information voters, specifically those with lower levels of education. Increased turnout among these peripheral voters may or may not hurt this campaign depending on who they are and how they are likely to vote, which will be discussed later.

The Effect of Vote-By-Mail Systems on Turnout and Voting

Washington is one of two states, along with Oregon, that conduct their elections through mail (Grygiel, 2011). Studies about the effects of this system in Oregon by Karp and Banducci (2000) and Berinsky, Burns and Traugott (2001) find that voting by mail increases turnout, but the effects are much greater for those who were already likely to participate than for the mobilization of new voters. A later study by Southwell (2004) argues that neither party benefits from this election reform because “any reported increase in turnout appears to draw diverse groups into the electorate” (p. 92). Since absentee voting also involves voting through mail, research regarding absentee voting may be useful in studying voting behavior when voters cast

ballots by mail. Dubin and Kaslow (1996) find that “absentee voters in Los Angeles county voted on approximately 5% fewer propositions” than voters who voted at the polls (p. 394). Contrary to the belief that absentee voters have more time to look over their ballots and therefore will complete their ballots, Dubin and Kaslow (1996) find evidence for the idea that with more complicated propositions on the ballot, “absentee voters may be rushed and therefore unwilling to wade through long propositions” (pp. 404-407). While voting on propositions in vote-by-mail only systems like in Washington may produce different results for proposition voting, this study suggests that complicated proposition language, no matter how high the turnout, might impede whether voters vote on initiatives.

Does High Voter Turnout Translate into More Democratic Votes?

Both studies about direct democracy campaigns and vote-by-mail systems indicate that Washington should experience high turnout in 2012. However, will high turnout favor this campaign by mobilizing voters who would be likely to vote for this initiative? Specifically, does high turnout lead to increased turnout among Democratic voters? The conventional model, developed in part by Tucker, Vedlitz and DeNardo (1986), suggests that because the likelihood that one will turn out to vote is strongly correlated with higher socio-economic status, higher turnout is associated with higher levels of individuals with lower SES coming to the polls. Furthermore, because “those with lower SES characteristics are more likely to support the Democratic Party,” higher turnout should favor Democratic candidates (Tucker et al., 1986, p. 1291-1292). Research has found empirical evidence for this phenomenon in presidential races in some states, but not all (Tucker et al., 1986), as well as evidence for this model in gubernatorial and senate races, although the relationship has since become insignificant (Nagel and McNulty, 1996). A more recent study by Citrin, Schickler and Sides (2003), which simulates scenarios in

which all eligible nonvoters vote and all registered voters vote in Senate elections, finds that with some exceptions “nonvoters usually are more Democratic than voters” (p. 83). Given that polling indicates stronger support for marijuana legalization among Democrats, increased turnout of the presidential election combined with a highly salient ballot initiative campaign could favor the campaign, but it should not be viewed as the only factor for winning.

Drop Off and Abstentions in Ballot Races

Simply because more voters show up does not mean that they will vote to pass a ballot initiative, and in some cases, they may not even vote on the initiative at all. Magelby (1984) measures drop-off in proposition races by looking at “the proportion of voters who cast ballots but who did not vote [...] on a proposition” (p. 83). Magelby (1984) found lower drop-off rates on popular initiatives than on legislative referendum due to the increased salience of these issues among voters. An earlier study by Mueller (1969) argued that controversy was a driving factor behind whether or not voters voted on certain propositions (p. 1201). Indeed, looking at controversial property tax initiatives that received a lot of public attention in the 1978 California midterm election, Magelby (1984) found that “some voters apparently turned out solely to vote on” these propositions (p. 92-93). According to Magelby (1984), the length of the ballot could have led to voter fatigue, which translated into higher drop off rates on some ballot measures.

Bowler and Donovan (1998) argue that the length of a ballot not only plays a role in whether or not voters cast a vote on ballot propositions, but also in whether or not they vote no. They find that for “every additional proposition on the total ballot in an election, individual propositions drew 37 percent more no votes” (Bowler and Donovan, 1998, p. 49). The authors also find that undecided voters tend to vote no on propositions (p. 49). However, the authors also find that voters will often “sort through lengthy California ballots, skip over the relatively

esoteric legislative constitutional amendments in the center, and then locate and cast votes on initiative measures they probably have heard something about” (p. 54). From these findings, it can be hypothesized that the increased salience of an initiative leads to a lower likelihood that voters would abstain or vote against a proposition. Bowler and Donovan (1998) also later suggest that voters can use cues and heuristics to determine how to vote on other ballot measures, which will be discussed later. Regardless, these findings indicate that initiative campaigns should try to increase the salience of their issues through paid and earned media so that voters will actively seek out these measures on Election Day.

The Role of Parties

Do Parties Get Involved?

Although Magelby (1984) argued that parties often did not get involved in propositions, recent research suggests that they frequently do. Not only do parties endorse ballot initiatives (Smith and Tolbert, 2001), but their involvement extends to direct contributions (Hasen, 2000; Smith and Tolbert, 2001), in-kind contributions (D. Smith, 2005), and get-out-the-vote efforts (Hasen, 2000). Based on the literature, there appears to be six main reasons that parties become involved in the process: to mobilize the party’s base or increase turnout (Hasen, 2000; Smith and Tolbert, 2001; Smith and Tolbert, 2004; Smith, 2005); to use certain initiatives as wedge issues against the opposing party (Bone and Benedict, 1975; Shrag, 1998; Smith and Tolbert, 2001; Smith, 2005); to prime support from voters who use ballot issue to evaluate candidates on election day (Nicholson, 2005; Donovan, Tolbert and Smith, 2008; Smith and Tolbert, 2010); to further ideological agendas or for ideological compatibility (Smith and Tolbert, 2001; Smith, 2005); for fundraising purposes (Smith and Tolbert, 2001; Smith and Tolbert, 2004; Smith, 2005); and for minority parties to bypass the legislative process (Hasen, 2000). But does this

involvement have any effect on the process? One way to measure the influence of parties on direct democracy campaigns is to look at whether or not vote choice on ballot measures is correlated with partisan affiliation (Smith and Tolbert, 2001).

Do People Rely on Parties for Cues?

Discussing the role of heuristics in voting behavior, Goren, Frederico and Kittilson (2009) argue that when a voter “hears a recognizable partisan advocating some position, her partisan leanings are activated, which in turn lead her to evaluate the message through a partisan lens” (p. 806). Do these partisan predispositions translate into voting behavior on ballot initiatives? Magelby (1984) argues that “ideological self-classification appears to determine voting behavior” in ballot initiative races more than partisan affiliation (p. 176). On the other hand, when looking at ballot initiatives in Washington state, Bone and Benedict (1975) find that correlations exist between party and vote choice on initiatives, especially if the party takes a stand on issues dealing with “welfare, taxes, and government reform” (p. 350). Even stronger correlations between partisan affiliation and vote choice on ballot measures have been found in recent empirical research.

In 1990, Californians voted on Proposition 140, an initiative dealing with term limits for state legislators (Bowler and Donovan, 1998). Since term-limits do not appear to be a strictly ideological issue, Bowler and Donovan (1998) wanted to know whether voters would vote on the initiative based on how they believed the measure would help the party with which they identified politically. The authors argued that self-identified Republicans, the minority party in the state legislature at the time, would be more likely to support the measure than those who identified with the Democratic Party. Bowler and Donovan (1998) found a strong positive relationship between whether or not a Republican voter was directly contacted by the Republican

Party and their support for Proposition 140. The opposite relationship was found for Democratic voters contacted by members of the Democratic Party, leading the authors to conclude that “many voters may nevertheless determine how to make instrumental decisions that further their party’s political interests” (p. 142). These findings suggest that voters will rely on partisan cues, especially when initiatives have no immediate ideological or financial implications.

Furthermore, Smith and Tolbert (2001) use both aggregate and survey data for California ballot initiatives between 1994 and 1998 to examine the relationship between party identification and voting behavior at both the county-level and individual level (p. 745-746). With the aggregate data, the authors find “political party affiliation is associated with the vote for 77 percent of the initiatives appearing on the ballot initiatives appearing on the 1998 California ballot, even after controlling for unemployment rates and county level racial/ethnic composition” (p. 746). Using the survey data, the authors support the aggregate data, finding that in 1994 and 1996 “political party affiliation appears to be the most salient predictor of voting behavior in direct democracy elections” (p. 749). As discussed in the introduction, Democratic voters in California during the 2010 election received mixed signals from leaders of the Democratic Party regarding their support of Proposition 19. Given the evidence that partisanship serves as a cue for voters when deciding ballot initiatives, this could help explain why Proposition 19 failed. This evidence also suggests that if an initiative campaign seeks support from party leaders, it should ensure that support is broad.

Legal Considerations

Marijuana became illegal in the United States in 1937 when Congress passed the Marijuana Tax Act, and penalties for possession and sale of the drug have become more and more severe over time. (Nielsen, 2010). The anti-drug and anti-marijuana crusade culminated in

the 1970s when President Richard Nixon “initiated a ‘war on drugs’ that emphasized law enforcement, prevention, and treatment” (Nielsen, 2010, p. 463). This war was strengthened by Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, the latter of which called drugs “the most pressing problem facing the nation.” (p. 464). Presidents since then have continued this war into the new millennium, even while some states have attempted to lessen penalties for drug use. Since 1996, over 15 states have legalized the use of marijuana for medical purposes (Carcieri, 2011). Still, the Obama administration has held strong against states attempting further liberalization of marijuana laws. When it appeared as though Proposition 19 might pass in California, “Attorney General Eric Holder threatened to enforce marijuana prohibition” regardless of changes to the state’s law (p. 305). This episode illustrates the current conflict between states that try to relax marijuana laws and the federal government’s continued enforcement of its war on drugs. Legalization of marijuana in Washington State will have its problems when it comes to reconciling federal law, but it will present a grand experiment in federalism.

When asked what was the most important aspect to developing a campaign plan for a ballot initiative, ACLU Policy Advocate Mark Cooke said, “You have to have a policy that you’re confident in and that you think people would be able to support because that’s the basis for getting your endorsers and your supporters or your sponsors, which are the ones you really want to be making the arguments for you. It really starts with a carefully drafted law in the first place that you can then use to get funders interested and asking about the campaign” (personal communication, November 29, 2012). This was one of the lessons Cooke and the supporters of Initiative 502 in Washington learned from Proposition 19 in California. For Cooke, because there was not a specific explanation of how legal marijuana would be regulated under state law, as

voters found out more about the proposition, the less they supported it. This was also confirmed by the recent Rasumussen (2012) poll that showed more support when voters were asked about whether they supported legalizing and regulating marijuana.

Furthermore, this campaign should have a clear understanding of the ballot initiative process, namely how to get an initiative on the ballot. While the signature gathering process will be discussed in more detail in the actual campaign plan, it is important to note that Washington State has various methods for getting an initiative on the ballot. One way just involves the traditional signature gathering process, where the sponsoring organization files the initiative, obtains the necessary signatures and the initiative automatically goes on the ballot. Cooke, however, argued that another strategy might be more advantageous. According to Cooke, “Washington has another initiative called an initiative to the legislature, which is similar in that you have to file it and get the signatures necessary, but then it actually goes to the legislature as a bill” before it reaches the ballot. While the legislature can take multiple actions with this process, most of the time, they simply do nothing and let it automatically go on the ballot after a hearing. Cooke argues that this strategy gives the campaign almost “a full year to get the issue out to the public” because campaigns generally have to file for this process earlier. He also said that this strategy also produces “a lot of earned media around the legislative session.” Because the literature suggests that increasing the salience of the initiative is important, this strategy seems like a more effective way to get the initiative on the ballot for this campaign.

Chapter 3

Methods and Objectives for the Campaign Plan

Campaign Plan Structure

This project has developed a comprehensive plan for a hypothetical ballot initiative in Washington State during the 2012 Election Cycle. This initiative proposes that marijuana be legalized and regulated by the state of Washington in a similar manner to alcohol, with controls on the production, distribution and sale of marijuana throughout the state. The campaign plan includes the following sections:

- Background and Planning
 - Political Environment and Demographic Analysis
 - Signature Gathering and Filing Plan
- Communications
 - Campaign Message/Theme
 - Targeting and Polling Plan
 - Voter Contact Plan
- Finance
 - Fundraising Plan
 - Budget

Below are a list of objectives and methods to obtain the information to complete those objectives for this project.

A. Political Environment and Demographic Analysis

This section determines the political environment in Washington for the 2012 election cycle. To obtain this information, the campaign uses polls, previous election results and news articles to determine what type of people vote in the state and what issues they believe are important in the 2012 election cycle. This section also determines the demographic makeup of

Washington State, which will be obtained from Census data. Using polls about this issue, the plan shows the different attitudes of each demographic group in Washington about this issue. The objective from this section is to determine which groups will be targeted in the campaign's message and voter contact plan.

C. Signature Gathering and Filing Plan

Using resources from the Washington Secretary of State, the campaign plan outlines the necessary steps for filing an initiative and how many signatures are required to get the initiative on the ballot. The plan lays out deadlines of when signatures need to be collected, especially since this campaign will likely use the initiative to legislature process discussed earlier. Once the threshold of signatures is determined, the plan describes the best way to collect them.

C. Campaign Message/Theme

Developing a campaign theme draws upon the literature review, the political environment and the demographic analysis. First, I identify the pros and cons of the issue. It will be important to know what messages opponents will use to fight the issue. Then I make a list of talking points in support of the issue as well as talking points against the issue. Using these talking points, I create a message by framing the issue in terms of why people should support it rather than oppose it. I use the demographic analysis to develop a message that will appeal to key groups. These messages create the overall theme of the campaign.

D. Targeting and Polling Plan

The demographic analysis provides some insight into the key groups that the campaign needs to target for its voter contact plan. Among these groups, the campaign establishes likely voters and persuadable voters. The targeting plan also identifies key areas that deserve the most attention from the campaign. Although this campaign plan uses current polls to develop a

campaign theme message, it will be necessary to conduct internal polling throughout the campaign. The plan identifies polling questions which might help best measure public support. The plan suggests an ideal number of polls to conduct to keep track of public support.

F. Voter Contact Plan

For paid media, the plan develops an advertising plan that directs the message at key demographic groups. Television and radio advertising can reach a wide audience and will make up most of the budget for the campaign. For earned media, the campaign plan identifies key points throughout the campaign to issue press releases and alert the media of campaign events. Many of these events will be key endorsements or polling results. This part of the plan will also lay out specific groups from which the campaign hopes to receive endorsements and support. This might include the American Civil Liberties Union and even the Washington State Democratic Party. Based on the academic research and case study of Proposition 19, it is important to note that when seeking party endorsements, it should receive endorsements from most statewide leaders of the party. Other groups may provide the campaign with resources in its signature gathering campaign. The political environment provides insights into what groups will actively campaign against the initiative, how much money they might raise and what their influence might be on the process.

G. Fundraising Plan and Budget

Using past election fundraising numbers from similar ballot measures and data about who gives to pro-legalization interest groups, the campaign develops a preliminary fundraising plan. These records are obtained from the Washington Public Disclosure Commission (<http://www.pdc.wa.gov/>) and the National Institute on Money in State Politics (<http://followthemoney.org>). The fundraising plan lays out how much the campaign should

expect to fundraise from small and large donors. Given that this campaign plan expects to conduct a television advertising campaign, the fundraising plan aims for about \$6 million. Using the final fundraising numbers, the plan develops a preliminary line-item budget, which will be determined by all of the previous plans mentioned above. This section also includes a time-line of campaign activities.

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APPENDIX

Interview Mark Cooke, Policy Advocate with ACLU of Washington

November 29, 2012

Interview Transcribed from Recorded Phone Interview

In what way did the ACLU Washington help the campaign?

Cooke: Well, the ACLU of Washington was a supporter and endorser of the initiative 502 campaign, which was run by a separate entity called New Approach Washington. And part of our support of I-502, we gave some cash and in-kind contributions to the I-502 campaign, which included loaning our drug policy director full-time to be the campaign director and then there were a few of us in the ACLU that donated some time to the campaign. So I was a policy adviser to the I-502 campaign

What was the name of the policy director that ACLU Washington donated to the campaign?

Cooke: Allison Holcomb, so she is now is the ACLU Washington drug policy director, but during the campaign, she was on loan as the campaign director

Just to get some background information about Washington and about how this initiative came about, could you explain what happened, if you know, with I-1068, the 2010 initiative to legalize marijuana?

Cooke: Sure, so Initiative 1068 and there was another in 2011 and I can't remember the number of it ... those were initiatives to people that were filed in 2010 and 2011 that would have legalized marijuana for people 18 and older, but they were never able to get the necessary number of signatures...to get placed on the ballot.

Were there any differences in the language of those initiatives that might have helped them from getting the signatures necessary?

Cooke: Well, I can't answer that. I can say that there are definitely differences between those initiatives, so 1068 and the initiative that followed it the next year were different from 502 in that they didn't set up a regulatory system in the initiative itself. It basically would have just repealed most of Washington State's criminal marijuana laws. That was pretty much what they did. Where, versus 502, which legalized possession for adults and then set up a regulatory system for production, processing and selling marijuana.

And from my understanding, the ACLU did not endorse at least I-1068, is that correct?

Cooke: That's correct. We didn't support either of those.

I don't know how much that you [and the campaign staff] researched this whenever you were starting your campaign, but what do you think explains the failure of Proposition 19 in California?

Cooke: Well, I don't have an exact answer and it would be my own personal opinion, I guess. I mean it was very close was one [reason]. I think two factors was that they ran it in a non-presidential election year so turnout in non-presidential election years is smaller than in the presidential years. It also has a lower turnout for young people, and young people are some of the biggest supporters of marijuana law reform so that was part of it. I think the other one for Prop 19 is that it was going to allow all local governments in the state to come up with their own regulations instead of kind of having a state-wide regulatory system, and I think that some people viewed that as being problematic in that it was just going to be so confusing about who could do what and where. It maybe was not the best policy.

Did your organization or did New Approach Washington take away any lesson from that initiative [Proposition 19] or other initiatives that had been tried in the past?

Cooke: Yea, I think so. I mean I think [Initiative] 502 was set up to be a very smart way of dealing with marijuana. It would change the criminal laws, but at the same time set up a tightly regulated public health approach to marijuana that would be conducted at the state level. And I think that was a reflection of lessons learned from other initiatives.

You mentioned young people as being a targeted demographic. Would you say that there were any other targeted demographics and if so, why?

Cooke: Well so young people, just traditionally, if you ask them "would you support marijuana legalization, are more likely to say, "Yes." But those voters alone won't get you a majority. So what you kind of have to do is focus on demographic groups that don't think our current marijuana laws are working, but aren't necessarily ready to just up and legalize marijuana. We really tried to get them to become "Yes" voters. So some of those are like women and mothers, in particular. So if you look at the advertisements for I-502, two of them tend to focus on the soccer-mom type.

Did you try to reach out to the older demographics at all?

Cooke: So the campaign was trying to educate everybody about the issue. Utilizing law enforcement spokespeople to really get the message out that our current laws aren't working and that we should be taking a different approach was focused to everybody. No, I don't think there was a specific efforts to solely target old voters.

How often would say that law enforcement spokespeople appeared in advertisements or direct mail or any sort of voter contact information?

Cooke: The campaign's primary public education tools were paid television advertising. There were four advertisements for New Approach [Washington]. There were two with mothers or middle-aged women and then the two others were of law enforcement. One was of John McKay, a former U.S. Attorney here in Washington state and the second one was of three former federal law enforcement officials John McKay, former U.S. Attorney, another former U.S. Attorney named Kate Pflaumer and then a former FBI Agent. So those ads ran throughout the fall.

What would you say is a reasonable budget to expect for a ballot initiative race like this?

Cooke: I only know how much this campaign spent roughly and I haven't seen the final tally. But it cost several hundred thousand dollars to run the signature campaign and to get the signatures for the campaign. The television advertisements were several million dollars. I want to say the total was around 6 million.

Did you run the advertisements in all of Washington's media markets or did you just run them in certain markets?

Cooke: I don't know this for sure. A lot of them were focused on Puget Sound, which is where Seattle is and Spokane, which is the largest city in Eastern Washington on the major networks, if I recall. You know like ABC, NBC, CBS, those ones. And then I think they did do some cable advertising on cable channels throughout the state, but I wasn't involved in those ad buys, so I don't know.

Did you use any other type of voter contact strategies such as door to door, any sort of direct mail?

Cooke: No, there wasn't any formal GOTV doorbelling or direct mail. The focus was on getting earned media, you know trying to get stories in the normal media. And then did do quite a few events and some rally type activities

Without giving away too much, how would you describe your fundraising strategy? How did you determine who your donor base is going to be?

Cooke: So the campaign focused on a variety of [ways] to try to raise money for it, you know, including basic online small donations. And then individuals that have given to drug reform movements in the pass to try to get sizeable donations.

Were the political parties involved at all in the initiative? Did any actively endorse the initiative?

Cooke: Yeah, if you go to the New Approach Washington website, you can see the list of endorsements, but the campaign got a good percentage of the local wards and the state Democratic party. I can't recall if there are any Republican ones that were there. And I'm sure there were a few smaller third parties.

Did the parties help with the signature gathering process?

Cooke: That was all pretty much independent from my recollection.

The initiative had to be sent to the legislature before it went to the ballot, is that correct?

Cooke: We have two ways to run an initiative under the Washington Constitution. One is just the normal initiative to the people, where you file it in the same year that will be on the ballot. Where you go out and file the initiative, and you have to get a requisite number of signatures and then if you get them, it goes onto the ballot automatically. But Washington has another initiative called an initiative to the legislature, which is similar in that you have to file it and get the signatures necessary, but then it actually goes to the legislature as a bill. And then the legislature can do three things with it. They can just vote to pass it and then it just becomes law. They could pass a separate law or separate bill on the same subject, in which case both the original initiative and the second bill onto the ballot and it becomes a two part question, which is do you want either or neither of these two [proposals] to be approved. If you vote either, then you pick between the two and whichever one gets more votes, assuming 50 percent wanted one of them to pass. In this instance, the legislature took the third option, which is what everybody expected, was that they just do nothing. So they basically had a hearing on it, but they don't have anything and they don't vote on it and then it automatically goes onto the ballot as an initiative.

It was a conscious choice to do it that way, because it gave it more time, so it got filed in 2011 and it wasn't voted on until November 2012, so it gave a full year to get the issue out to the public and then there was a lot of earned media around the legislative session, where they had hearings on it and things like that. It was a conscious choice to do it that way and not do the traditional initiative.

What would you say are the most important things to remember when developing a campaign plan for a ballot initiative like this?

Cooke: Well, I mean I think it starts with the law itself. You have to have a policy that you're confident in and that you think people would be able to support because that's the basis for getting your endorsers and your supporters or your sponsors, which are the ones you really want to be making the arguments for you. It really starts with a carefully drafted law in the first place that you can then use to get funders interested and asking about the campaign.

Part 2

The Campaign Plan



NOTE: This campaign plan has been written as if it is March of 2011, over a year before the November 6, 2012 election. The plan is based primarily on documents, sources and data from before this period.

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**Background
and
Preparation**

I. Political Environment

Although initiatives aimed at the legalization of marijuana have generally failed, the state of Washington seems to have all of the necessary ingredients to make a push for this reform a success. In 1998, Washington was one of the first states to legalize medical marijuana, and it did so through a ballot initiative.¹ In 2003, Seattle voted to make marijuana possession “the lowest police priority.”² Now, legalization efforts have begun in the state legislature. On January 25, 2011, a bill filed by state Rep. Mary Lou Dickerson, a Seattle Democrat,

would allow the sale of marijuana to people 21 and over through state liquor stores. The Liquor Control Board would issue licenses to commercial growers, and revenue from sales taxes and license fees – possibly hundreds of millions of dollars a year, according to supporters – could help pay for health care and substance abuse treatment.³

Dickerson is not the only Washington Democrat to support legalization. In 2010, 62 percent of the delegates at the Washington State Democratic Party Convention voted to endorse I-1068, a previous marijuana legalization initiative.⁴

On February 8, 2011, the Washington state House Public Safety Committee debated Rep. Dickerson’s proposed legislation, House Bill 1550, with proponents arguing that legalization would increase state revenue, reduce use among youth and “remove profits from criminals.”⁵ Opponents countered that the state would likely not see any revenue because of federal intervention and that young people would still be able to get marijuana like alcohol.⁶ The bill has not moved beyond this

committee. On February 27, 2011 the *Seattle Times* published an editorial endorsement of legalization efforts, arguing that Washingtonians would be more likely to approve a legalization initiative because the state “is ahead of California.”⁷ The editorial cited that Washington was the first state to vote in favor of gay civil unions, while California voters turned it down. In May of 2010, The Washington Poll, “a non-partisan, academic survey research project [...] at the University of Washington,” asked a sample of 1,252 registered voters whether the state should remove civil and criminal penalties for the possession or use of marijuana. Indeed, the poll found that 52 percent of respondents approved of such a policy while only 35 percent disapproved.⁸

Washington State’s past success with drug reform initiatives, endorsements from one of the state’s major political parties, the fact that its state legislature is seriously debating the measure, favorable public opinion and prominent media endorsements all point to Washington being prime for reform efforts. However, before a campaign plan can be developed, it will be necessary to analyze the state of Washington’s political environment. To do this, we will need to look at the state’s population, partisanship, recent election history, geographical divisions, demographics and public opinion.

A. Population

According to the 2010 U.S. Census, the state of Washington has a population of around 6,724,540 people.⁹ King County, where Seattle is located, has the largest population of 1,931,249, followed by Pierce County, Snohomish County, Spokane

County and Clark County with populations of 795,225, 713,335, 417,221, and 436,363 respectively. The top three counties are all located near Puget Sound, the ocean inlet on Washington’s West coast. Spokane County is located on the far-east side of Washington, on the border of Idaho, while Clark County sits on the southwest border of the state, near Portland, Oregon. Below is a table of the 2010 census populations for each of Washington’s 39 counties followed by a map of the state by county.

Table 1. 2010 Population by County in Washington¹⁰

COUNTY	2010 Pop.	COUNTY	2010 Pop.
King County	1,931,249	Walla Walla County	58,781
Pierce County	795,225	Whitman County	44,776
Snohomish County	713,335	Stevens County	43,531
Spokane County	471,221	Okanogan County	41,120
Clark County	425,363	Kittitas County	40,915
Thurston County	252,264	Douglas County	38,431
Kitsap County	251,133	Jefferson County	29,872
Yakima County	243,231	Asotin County	21,623
Whatcom County	201,140	Pacific County	20,920
Benton County	175,177	Klickitat County	20,318
Skagit County	116,901	Adams County	18,728
Cowlitz County	102,410	San Juan County	15,769
Grant County	89,120	Pend Oreille County	13,001
Island County	78,506	Skamania County	11,066
Franklin County	78,163	Lincoln County	10,570
Lewis County	75,455	Ferry County	7,551
Grays Harbor County	72,797	Columbia County	4,078
Chelan County	72,453	Wahkiakum County	3,978
Clallam County	71,404	Garfield County	2,266
Mason County	60,699	TOTAL	6,724,540

Before continuing this discussion, it is important to highlight that the population of some cities in Washington exceed the populations of its largest

counties. According to the 2010 Census data, for instance, the city of Seattle had a population of 608,660; the city of Spokane had a population of 208,916; and the city of Tacoma had a population of 198,397.

Figure 1. Washington State by County



B. Vote Goal

Although looking at the population is helpful in figuring out where people are heavily concentrated, it doesn't tell us much about how many people actually vote. Therefore, it is important to get an idea of just how many people will show up to the polls and how many of those people need to vote for this measure in order to win. To do this, I will briefly analyze the turnout and results of the 2008 General Election since 2012 will be a presidential year and should experience similar turnout levels. The estimated population of Washington in 2008 was around 6,550,000 people.¹¹ Turnout for I-985 was 2,907,372; turnout for I-1000 was 2,966,474; and turnout for

I-1029 was 2,914,506. Average turnout for state-wide initiatives in 2008 was 2,929,450 or about 44.7 percent of the total population.

Based on the 2010 Census, the current estimated population for the state of Washington was around 6,725,000. Therefore, this campaign should estimate that the total population will be around 6,800,000 people for the 2012 election. If we assume that turnout on initiatives will be close to 45 percent of the population, we should expect at least 3,060,000 votes on the initiative. Assuming a turnout of 3.1 million votes in 2012, the initiative would need at least 1,550,001 votes to win. However, this campaign should shoot for at least a 5-point victory. Therefore the vote goal for this campaign will be 1,705,000 votes in order to win 55 percent of the vote.

VOTE GOAL - 1,705,000

C. Partisanship and Election History

When it comes to presidential elections, Washington State has consistently been a “blue-state.” In 2008, Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama picked up the electoral votes of Washington State, winning 57.7 percent of the vote.¹² Republican candidate John McCain only won 40.5 percent of the vote.¹³ In fact, no Republican since Ronald Reagan in 1984 has won Washington’s electoral votes. But how much can we read into this blue state/red state divide in terms of determining the partisan leanings of the people of Washington? Indeed, political scientist Morris P. Fiorina has observed that the red state vs. blue state dichotomy, prevalent in the media’s coverage of elections, exaggerates the homogeneity of the

partisan and ideological leanings of citizens within these states.¹⁴ Therefore, it is important to look beyond the state and presidential level to develop a more nuanced explanation of the partisan leanings of Washington's voters.

Figure 2. 2008 Presidential Election Results by County




Figure 3. 2008 Gubernatorial Election Results by County






Figure 4. 2010 Senatorial Election Results by County



Since Washington uses a top-two primary system,¹⁵ voters do not need to register with a political party. Therefore, a good way to analyze the partisanship of the electorate is to analyze previous election results. When you look at the 2008 presidential election (Figure 2), the 2008 gubernatorial election (Figure 3) and the 2010 senatorial election (Figure 4) by county, it becomes harder to categorize Washington as a purely “blue” state. Most counties in the Puget Sound region appear to swing toward the Democratic Party, with some exceptions. The central and eastern part of the state seems to consistently vote Republican. The southwestern counties in the state have swung back and forth, depending on the election, indicating a more even split of Republican and Democratic voters. Using the previous county-level election results, I have identified (in Figure 5) the counties that appear to lean heavily toward Republicans (red), those that lean heavily toward Democrats (blue) and swing counties (purple).

Figure 5. Estimated County Partisan Strength Based on Previous Elections



In Table 2.1 through Table 2.3, I have sorted the counties by partisan strength as determined in Figure 5. I have also sorted each county by the number of registered voters in 2008 and have added the 2008 vote share for the Democratic Gubernatorial candidate, the last state-wide election in a presidential year.¹⁶ The three strongest Democratic counties based on number of registered voters and the share of the 2008 vote for the Democratic Gubernatorial candidate are King, Snohomish, and Thurston counties. These counties had a combined total of 1,629,675 registered voters in 2008, making up 44.9 percent of the total registered voters for the entire state of Washington. Of the total state-wide votes cast for the Democratic gubernatorial candidate in 2008, these three counties made up 51.5 percent of those votes. When you include Pierce County, these four counties alone make up 61.9 percent of the votes cast for the Democratic candidate. Although I have labeled Spokane County as a Republican-leaning county, it is important to note that the Republican gubernatorial candidate only won 52 percent of the vote

and that 104,369 voters voted for the Democratic candidate, which is more than the total number of registered voters in the second largest Republican-leaning county.

Table 2.1 Strong Democratic Counties

County	Partisan Strength	2008 Reg. Voters	% Voted for Dem Gov. in 2008
King County	Democratic	1,108,128	64 %
Snohomish County	Democratic	372,636	53 %
Thurston County	Democratic	148,911	58 %
Kitsap County	Democratic	144,690	51 %
Whatcom County	Democratic	115,314	55 %
Grays Harbor County	Democratic	36,702	54 %
Jefferson County	Democratic	22,160	64 %
Pacific County	Democratic	13,052	52 %
San Juan County	Democratic	11,624	68 %
TOTAL		1,973,217	

Table 2.2 Swing Counties

County	Partisan Strength	2008 Reg. Voters	% Voted for Dem Gov. in 2008
Pierce County	Swing	411,103	51 %
Clark County	Swing	216,508	49 %
Skagit County	Swing	65,129	50 %
Cowlitz County	Swing	55,331	46 %
Island County	Swing	47,629	50 %
Clallam County	Swing	45,766	49 %
Mason County	Swing	32,828	50 %
Whitman County	Swing	20,542	48 %
Klickitat County	Swing	12,171	45 %
Skamania County	Swing	6,650	48 %
Wahkiakum County	Swing	2,733	42 %
TOTAL		916,390	

Table 2.3 Strong Republican Counties

County	Partisan Strength	2008 Reg. Voters	% Voted for Dem Gov. in 2008
Spokane County	Republican	258,952	48 %
Yakima County	Republican	97,856	39 %
Benton County	Republican	87,059	30 %
Lewis County	Republican	41,635	35 %
Chelan County	Republican	38,650	38 %
Grant County	Republican	32,910	32 %
Walla Walla County	Republican	31,606	38 %
Stevens County	Republican	26,875	35 %
Franklin County	Republican	23,530	32 %
Kittitas County	Republican	20,631	39 %
Okanogan County	Republican	20,562	39 %
Douglas County	Republican	18,936	34 %
Asotin County	Republican	12,012	44 %
Pend Oreille County	Republican	7,799	42 %
Lincoln County	Republican	6,899	35 %
Adams County	Republican	6,191	30 %
Ferry County	Republican	4,259	38 %
Columbia County	Republican	2,585	31 %
Garfield County	Republican	1,564	32 %
TOTAL		740,511	

Using the results of the 2008 election for Governor,¹⁷ we can see just how much of an impact the counties I have labeled as Democratic can have on an election. If, for the sake of argument, we were to assume that everyone who voted in 2008 for the Democratic gubernatorial candidate was going to vote yes on the ballot measure for this campaign, then these Democratic counties alone would produce 980,967 votes in favor of the imitative, 57 percent of the 1,705,000 vote goal. If you add in the 166,562 Democratic votes from Pierce County, that would make 67 percent of the votes needed. The inclusion of all Democratic votes from the rest of

the Swing counties would constitute 79 percent of the votes needed to win. Finally, the Democratic votes from Spokane would give this campaign almost 86 percent of the votes need to pass the ballot initiative.

However, as we will see later, not all self-identified Democrats in Washington support the legalization of marijuana, so the thought experiment above only helps to show the considerable sway that less than half of all Washington counties can have on an election. Yet, to see if there might be some correlation between the partisan-leanings of each county and marijuana issues, it might be helpful to look at the results of the 1998 election during which voters approved an initiative (I-692) to legalize medical marijuana in Washington State.¹⁸

As Table 2.4 shows, the top 6 counties with the highest margin of victory for I-692 are all counties that I have labeled as Democratic. The average margin of victory for all Democratic counties was 20.8 points. The table also shows that the 6 counties with the highest margin of defeat were all Republican counties. Indeed, the average of margin of victory for the measure in Republican counties was 2.3 points. Swing counties had an average margin of victory of 7.3 points. Although medical marijuana and outright legalization are different issues, this table does show that there are clear differences based on partisanship and geographic area on drug-related issues. However, it also shows that a few seemingly strong Republican counties can also show support for looser marijuana laws.

Table 2.4 Results of 1998 I-692 Medical Marijuana Initiative by County

County	Approved/ Failed	Percent Difference	Partisan Strength	Percent Y	Percent N
San Juan County	Approved	43%	Democratic	71%	29%
King County	Approved	34%	Democratic	67%	33%
Jefferson County	Approved	30%	Democratic	65%	35%
Whatcom County	Approved	19%	Democratic	59%	41%
Kitsap County	Approved	18%	Democratic	59%	41%
Snohomish County	Approved	16%	Democratic	58%	42%
Pierce County	Approved	15%	Swing	58%	42%
Asotin County	Approved	15%	Republican	57%	43%
Whitman County	Approved	15%	Swing	57%	43%
Island County	Approved	14%	Swing	57%	43%
Kittitas County	Approved	13%	Republican	57%	43%
Chelan County	Approved	13%	Republican	57%	43%
Clallam County	Approved	10%	Swing	55%	45%
Douglas County	Approved	10%	Republican	55%	45%
Pacific County	Approved	10%	Democratic	55%	45%
Ferry County	Approved	10%	Republican	55%	45%
Thurston County	Approved	10%	Democratic	55%	45%
Skagit County	Approved	9%	Swing	54%	46%
Pend Oreille County	Approved	9%	Republican	54%	46%
Spokane County	Approved	8%	Republican	54%	46%
Benton County	Approved	8%	Republican	54%	46%
Mason County	Approved	8%	Swing	54%	46%
Skamania County	Approved	8%	Swing	54%	46%
Grays Harbor County	Approved	7%	Democratic	53%	47%
Clark County	Approved	6%	Swing	53%	47%
Wahkiakum County	Approved	3%	Swing	51%	49%

Table 2.4 (Continued)

County	Passed?	+/- %	Partisanship	Yes	No
Okanogan County	Approved	2%	Republican	51%	49%
Walla Walla County	Approved	2%	Republican	51%	49%
Franklin County	Approved	1%	Republican	51%	49%
Columbia County	Approved	0%	Republican	50%	50%
Stevens County	Failed	-3%	Republican	48%	52%
Klickitat County	Failed	-3%	Swing	48%	52%
Cowlitz County	Failed	-5%	Swing	48%	52%
Lewis County	Failed	-6%	Republican	47%	53%
Garfield County	Failed	-6%	Republican	47%	53%
Grant County	Failed	-6%	Republican	47%	53%
Lincoln County	Failed	-9%	Republican	46%	54%
Yakima County	Failed	-3%	Republican	48%	52%
Adams County	Failed	-14%	Republican	43%	57%
TOTAL		18%		59%	41%

I will also analyze the partisanship of the state by looking at Congressional districts. Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the results of the 2008 and 2010 U.S. House of Representatives elections by county.

Figure 6. 2008 U.S. House Election Results





Figure 7. 2010 U.S. House Election Results



Of Washington’s nine congressional districts, the only district that changed between 2008 and 2010 was District 3. Before the 2010 midterm election, six term representative for the third district Brian Baird decided not to seek re-election.¹⁹ In the midterm election, Republicans picked up the third district with Jaime Herrera Beutler, who, according to her website, “is one of the youngest women currently serving in the U.S. Congress “ and is the “first Hispanic in history to represent Washington state in the U.S. House of Representatives.”²⁰ For the most part, however, the election history and partisan alignment of the congressional districts seems to align with the partisanship of the counties as outlined above.

Finally, given the strong support of drug reform among the libertarian movement, it is necessary to briefly discuss the impact of the Libertarian Party in Washington State. With the adoption of a top-two primary system in 2008, in which the top two candidates who receive the most votes in the primary move on to the general election regardless of party, there were no elections for state-wide office in

which a candidate from the Libertarian Party was on the ticket. On the federal level, Libertarian presidential candidate Bob Barr received a measly 0.42 percent of the vote.²¹ However, if we look at the 2004 election, in which third party candidates could qualify for the ballot, we can see how much support third party candidates, particularly Libertarian Party candidates, received in other races.

In 2004, the counties in which the Libertarian candidate for president, Michael Badnarik, received the most votes were King (3,533), Snohomish (1,213), Pierce (1,084) and Clark (657).²² However, in each of these counties, Badnarik's share of the vote was negligible. Down ballot, however, Libertarian candidates fared a little better. The Libertarian candidate for U.S. Senate, J. Mills, received 8,947 votes in King, 3,846 votes in Pierce, 3,818 votes in Snohomish, 2,648 votes in Spokane and 1,901 votes in Clark. Statewide, however, Mills still only received 1.21 percent of the vote. On the other hand, Libertarian candidates for state-wide offices received higher shares of the vote in many counties. In King County, the gubernatorial candidate received 18,906 votes, the candidate for lieutenant governor received 42,226 votes, the candidate for secretary of state received 25,980 votes, the candidate for state treasurer received 29,332 votes and the candidate for insurance commissioner garnered 31,360 votes. However, with the exception of the candidate for Lt. Governor, none of these candidates broke 5 percent of the vote.

It is also hard, without an in depth academic study, to tell what motivated these voters to cast ballots for the Libertarian candidate in these races. Was it a protest vote of the two major parties or were there policies supported by these

candidates that the voters liked? It was probably a mixture of both, but it would be a leap to say, based on these results alone, that Washington has a strong libertarian movement. Furthermore, it would be even harder to argue that every person who cast a ballot for the Libertarian candidate supports the legalization of marijuana.

D. Geographical Divisions and Demographics

After looking at the partisanship and election history by county and congressional district, I have separated Washington into 3 distinct regions (Figure 8). These geographic regions will be labeled as Puget Sound, Southwest and East (Figure 9).

Figure 8 Regions by Congressional District




Figure 9 Puget Sound, Southwestern and Eastern Regions



The Eastern region is made up of the fourth and fifth congressional districts; the Southwestern region is made up of the third and eighth congressional districts; and the Puget Sound region is made up of first, second, sixth, seventh and ninth congressional districts. I have made these separations based on the partisan leanings and previous election results. Overall, the Puget Sound region includes mostly Democratic-leaning counties, the Eastern region includes mostly Republican-leaning counties and the Southwestern region has most of the swing counties.

Using these divisions, we can take a look at the demographic characteristics of the state based on 2010 Census data.

Table 3.1 Demographic Breakdowns by Age, Race, Ethnicity and Region

	% of Total Population		
	Puget Sound	Southwest	East
18 and over	78.2%	74.6%	74.3%
18-24	10.1%	7.9%	11.1%
25-34	14.9%	12.7%	12.8%
35-49	21.1%	22.3%	18.5%
50-64	20.0%	20.0%	19.0%
65+	12.4%	11.6%	12.9%
White	74.7%	80.5%	80.1%
African-American	5.1%	2.3%	1.2%
Asian	8.8%	8.5%	1.8%
Hispanic	9.1%	7.3%	20.6%
AIAN	1.5%	1.0%	2.3%
TOTAL Population	3,363,420	1,590,102	1,498,018

Immediately, it is clear that the Puget Sound region, despite being the smallest geographic region, has a higher population than the Eastern and Southwestern regions combined. In terms of age, the Puget Sound region has the highest percentage of those aged 18-34 at 25 percent, compared to 23.9 percent in the Eastern region and 20.6 percent in the Southwest. In all, 55.1 percent of all Washington citizens between the ages of 18 and 34 live in the Puget Sound region even though only 52.1 percent of the total population lives there. When it comes to other age groups, there appear to be no significant differences among the regions.

The Puget Sound region also has the largest percentage of African-Americans. Of all the African-Americans in the state, 75.9 percent live in the Puget Sound region. This region also has the highest share of all racial minorities, including Asians and American Indians and Alaskan Natives. However, when it comes to ethnicity, a higher share of Eastern Washingtonians identifies as Hispanic

than in any other region. Indeed, a plurality of Washington Hispanics (42.2 percent) lives in the Eastern region. However, about 41.9 percent of the Hispanics in the state still live in the Puget Sound region. Because this is a presidential election and because President Obama draws a lot of support from minorities, it will be important to recognize the key areas and regions for the campaign to mobilize minority voters in the state to vote for our initiative. It will also become important as the campaign begins to develop its message since minorities are disproportionately affected by the War on Drugs, which will be discussed later.

From the data on partisanship, population and demographics, it appears as though the Puget Sound region will receive a lot of focus from this campaign. To get a better insight, I have broken down the region further to analyze demographic differences. I will also look at the eighth congressional district since it encompasses both King and Pierce counties, two of the largest counties in the state.

Figure 10. Puget Sound Region Broken Down by District



Table 3.2 Puget Sound Region by House District by Age

Congressional District	Total Pop.	18-34	35-49	50-64	65+
1	739,455	22.5%	22.5%	20.7%	11.4%
2	760,041	23.0%	20.3%	20.6%	13.1%
6	709,570	22.7%	19.1%	21.4%	15.2%
7	704,225	31.2%	23.0%	18.6%	10.7%
8	810,754	20.4%	24.0%	19.4%	10.2%
9	723,129	24.4%	20.8%	18.9%	11.4%

Table 3.3 Puget Sound Region by House District by Race/Ethnicity

Congressional District	Total Population	White	African-American	Asian	Hispanic	AIAN
1	739,455	76.4%	2.7%	12.0%	7.6%	0.9%
2	760,041	84.4%	1.4%	3.5%	9.6%	2.1%
6	709,570	76.8%	5.5%	4.9%	8.5%	2.4%
7	704,225	67.3%	8.4%	14.3%	8.0%	0.9%
8	810,754	74.6%	3.0%	13.5%	7.2%	0.9%
9	723,129	67.9%	7.8%	9.3%	12.0%	1.3%

In terms of the age, the seventh, eighth and ninth districts have a much younger population than the other districts. These districts also have more cultural diversity, specifically when it comes to African-American, Asian and Hispanic populations. This is not surprising given that Seattle, one of Washington’s major cities, resides in the seventh district and is directly surrounded by the ninth and the eighth districts. Both young people and minority groups will likely serve as targets of this campaign, which will be discussed later.

Table 3.4 Gender Breakdown of 2008 General Election Voters by Age

Ages	Male	Female
18-24	44.5%	54.7%
25-34	45.2%	54.3%
35-44	47.0%	52.7%
45-54	47.1%	52.6%
55-64	47.6%	52.2%
65 +	45.8%	54.0%
Total	46.4%	53.2%

Finally, the last variable I have not analyzed is gender. Table 3.4 shows the gender differences among 2008 general election voters broken down by age.²³

According to these statistics from the 2008 general election, women in every age group vote by at least 5 percent more than men. This means that any message developed by this campaign should appeal to women and mobilize women supporters in order to secure a victory for the initiative. The development of this message will be discussed in a later section.

E. Public Opinion

Why is looking at the partisanship of the state so important for this campaign? As discussed in the literature review, an April 2010 study²⁴ and a March 2011 study by the Pew Research Center²⁵ shows how different demographic groups and self-identified partisans view the issue of legalization. In both polls, legalization received plurality support from Independents (49 percent). Democratic respondents increased from plurality support in 2010 (48 percent) to a majority in favor (53 percent) for the 2011 survey. Support among liberal Democrats has grown even stronger. The issue even gained support among Republicans.

Table 4.1 Pew Research Center Poll Asking Whether Respondent Supported Legalization of Marijuana, April 2010 – March 2011

	2010		2011	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Men	45%	47%	48%	47%
Women	38%	57%	42%	54%
White	42%	50%	N/A	N/A
Black	41%	56%	N/A	N/A
Hispanic	35%	61%	N/A	N/A
18-29	58%	39%	54%	42%
30-49	42%	53%	48%	47%
50-64	40%	49%	43%	50%
65+	22%	69%	30%	66%
Republican	24%	71%	30%	67%
Democrat	48%	47%	53%	43%
Liberal Dem.	57%	39%	66%	29%
Independent	49%	44%	49%	45%

In both 2010 and 2011, clear majorities of 18-29 year olds supported legalization, and a plurality of 30-49 year olds (48 percent) indicated support in the 2011 poll. Unfortunately, the report from 2011 did not include race as an independent variable, but the 2010 poll indicates that African-Americans and Hispanics are less supportive of legalization efforts than whites. It is important to remember, however, that this is a nation-wide poll and does not reflect the views of Washington’s citizens. It does, however, provide insight into possible differences to expect and shows how there is a strong partisan divide on this issue.

As discussed in the introduction to this section, a poll conducted in May of 2010 may shed some light into how registered voters in Washington might react to an initiative proposing the legalization of marijuana.²⁶ Similar to the results of the Pew Research Center polls, there are pronounced differences in public opinion when

it comes to partisanship. Democratic respondents approved of legalization by 64 percent to 25 percent and Independents approved by 54 percent to 35 percent. More Republican respondents disapproved of the proposal 47 percent to 34 percent, although it is worthy to note that 19 percent neither approved nor disapproved.

Table 4.2 The Washington Poll Responses to Whether WA Should Remove Criminal and Civil Penalties for Possession or Use of Marijuana, May 2010

	Approve	Disapprove
Statewide	52%	35%
Democrat	64%	25%
Republican	34%	47%
Independent	54%	35%
Puget Sound	56%	31%
Eastern WA	44%	45%
Other Western WA	51%	34%

Similar to this analysis of the political environment, although probably not in exactly the same manner, The Washington Poll divided their sample by region: Puget Sound region, Eastern Washington and Other Western Washington. Again, the poll asked respondents whether they would approve of removing state civil and criminal penalties for the possession or use of marijuana. As expected through my analysis of partisanship and the stronger support of legalization among Democrats, 56 percent of respondents from the Puget Sound region (see Table 4.2) approved of the proposal. A majority (51 percent) of respondents in the other Western Washington region also approved of the measure. Respondents in the Eastern Washington region were closely divided with 45 percent disapproving and 44 percent approving of the proposal.

F. Voting in Washington

Washington State has a vote-by-mail system in which ballots are sent to all registered voters at least 18 days before the election.²⁷ Ballots can then be returned through the mail, postmarked by Election Day, dropped off at a ballot drop box by 8 p.m. on Election Day or given to the county elections department in person by 8 p.m. on Election Day. Ballots are certified by matching the signature on the ballot to a signature in every person's voter registration record. This will be very important when trying to decide when to implement the campaign's communications strategy. When they receive their ballot, many voters are going to start actively looking for information about the initiatives, and the communications strategy should be putting as much information out as possible.

II. Initiative Language

Although, it will likely be given another number when submitted to the legislature, for now the initiative will be called Initiative 100. Below are the various provisions of the initiative. The campaign should consult legal advice for the correct wording of the following provisions for the actual ballot:

- This measure would approve the licensing and regulation of the sale, production, possession and use of marijuana;
- create a state-wide regulatory body to create rules, regulations and licensing requirements
- remove state criminal and civil penalties for these activities;
- create a legal limit of twenty-one years old for the purchase and use of marijuana;
- provide for the taxation of marijuana sales;
- amend state DUI laws to include maximum THC blood content;
- and allocate revenue from marijuana sales taxes to the state's general budget, drug-prevention programs and other drug awareness programs

III. Signature Gathering Plan

In order to generate more coverage for the initiative, this campaign should do an initiative to the legislature, in which the initiative is sent to the legislature before it is placed on the ballot. As discussed in the literature review, the legislature generally doesn't do anything with the initiative except give it a hearing, which can create earned or "free" media attention.

The Washington Secretary of State's Office provides a comprehensive manual of the rules and regulations for ballot initiatives.²⁸ Here are a few things that this campaign should keep in mind about getting the initiative on the ballot.

- Initiatives to the Legislature have to be filed within 10 months before the next regular legislative session. This gives the campaign a window of March 9, 2011 until January 9, 2012. The earlier the initiative is submitted, the earlier the campaign can issue a press release and possibly garner media coverage.
- Signature petitions have to be filed at least 10 days before the next Legislative session or by December 30, 2011.
- To file an initiative with the Secretary of State's office online, the campaign must:
 - Create an account and login information
 - Upload the full text of the initiative as a Word Document or RTF file
 - Pay a \$5 fee

- Provide a signed affidavit from each sponsor declaring that the sponsor is a registered voter in the state of Washington
- The campaign must also register with the Public Disclosure Commission
- After filing the initiative, obtaining a serial number and a ballot title and summary, the campaign needs to print signature petition sheets on 11 inch by 14 inch paper. The front of these sheets must include:
 - The official ballot title and summary as prepared by the Attorney General
 - The serial number
 - The heading
 - Not more than 20 numbered lines with enough room for a voter's signature, his/her printed name and voting address
 - Each petition must read:
 - “Every person who signs this petition with any other than his or her true name, knowingly signs more than one of these petitions, signs this petition when he or she is not a legal voter or makes any false statements on this petition may be punished by fine or imprisonment or both.”
 - The full text of the initiative must also be included on the petition
- The back must read:
 - “I, (The Signature Gatherer)_, swear or affirm under penalty of law that I circulated this sheet of the foregoing petition, and that, to the

best of my knowledge, every person who signed this sheet of the foregoing petition knowingly and without any compensation or promise of compensation willingly signed his or her true name and that the information provided therewith is true and correct. I further acknowledge that under chapter 29A.84 RCW, forgery of signatures on this petition constitutes a class C felony, and that offering any consideration or gratuity to any person to induce them to sign a petition is a gross misdemeanor, such violations being punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.”

- Only legally registered Washington voters can sign a petition
- In order to be placed on the ballot, the campaign must gather at least eight percent of the total number of votes cast for the office of Governor in the last regular state gubernatorial election.
 - In 2008, there were 3,002,862 votes cast for Governor.²⁹
 - This campaign needs to collect 240,229 signatures to reach 8 percent.
 - What about invalid signatures? A 2008 study by Donovan and Smith³⁰ found that from 1990 to 2006, the percent of signatures for ballot measures found to be invalid in Washington State averaged at 18.9 percent.
 - To account for the likely chance of invalid signatures, this campaign should assume that 20 percent of its signatures could be invalid.

- This campaign should have a goal of **300,000 signatures**, leaving room for an error of 59,771 invalid signatures, or roughly 20 percent.

About how much should campaigns expect to spend on signature gathering?

After looking at campaign finance data from the Washington Public Disclosure Commission³¹, it appears that most campaigns use consulting firms that specialize in signature gathering. The data also indicates that signature gathering efforts for initiatives for 2010 to 2011 cost campaigns anywhere from \$530,000 to \$1.13 million. Since this is a presidential election year and this campaign will be competing with a lot of other candidates, initiatives and other campaigns, this campaign should allocate at least \$1 million for its signature-gathering effort. After searching through consulting firms, it appears that PCI Consultants, Inc. (<http://www.progcamp.com/services/qualifying.html>) has a great track record with signature-gathering campaigns and would likely be willing to consult with this campaign given their support of other progressive initiatives.

Communications

IV. Message Development and Campaign Theme

Before developing a message, it is important to review some of the main lessons, in no particular order, from the literature review and the takeaways of the political environment analysis.

1. Many messages can be framed through an individual rights/freedom-based frame or a security/law and order frame.
2. Rights-based frames that focus solely on abstract rights instead of outcomes can leave the opposition in control of the message.
3. Liberals are more supportive of civil liberties and individual rights, while conservatives are more supportive of social order.
4. Messages that involve personal relevance rather than outright fear appeals can be more effective, especially if credible sources are used.
5. Some messages in which the source is likeable or similar to the audience can be effective in persuasion, particularly emotional or value-based messages.
6. However, if the message deals with a more complex issue, similarity or likeability in the source might fail because people want a more competent source. In these instances, sources should be experts.
7. Messages directed at young people should emphasize the importance, ease and social desirability of voting.
8. Proposition 19 failed because the opposition was able to point out the problems and chaos that might ensue from a city-based rather than state-wide regulatory scheme.
9. Based on national polling, Democrats, liberals, young people are the most supportive of legalization.
10. Independents also favor legalization.
11. Men are more supportive of legalization than women.
12. Whites are more supportive of legalization than African-Americans and Hispanics.
13. Washington State generally has a good track record on marijuana-related issues as well as support from politicians in the state legislature and the state Democratic Party.
14. Democrats in the state are very supportive of legalization.
15. The Puget Sound region has more young people, is more culturally diverse, is more Democratic and strongly supports legalization. It is also more dense in terms of population.
16. Eastern Washington has more Hispanics, but is more Republican and the least supportive of legalization.

It is also helpful to go through some arguments in favor of drug legalization and some arguments against to develop a message and theme.

Opposing Claim	Supporting Claim
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marijuana use will go up if it's legal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prohibition or banning the use, sale or possession of marijuana does not prevent people from obtaining it
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If marijuana is legalized, crime rates will increase 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marijuana use has not been eliminated through prohibition, so where do people get marijuana? • Prohibition keeps the sale, trade, production and profits on the black market and in the hands of criminals and gangs. • The black market is also not subject to health and safety regulations, which help to ensure that the marijuana is not laced with harmful chemicals or additives
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Children and adolescents will have easier access to marijuana 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prohibition does not prevent access by children and teenagers. In Washington, <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 2.7% of 6th Graders; ○ 11.4% of 8th Graders; ○ 30.8% of 10th Graders; ○ And 44.6% of 12th Graders have tried marijuana.³² ○ 23.4% of high school seniors reported having used marijuana in the last 30 days.³³ • Although alcohol limits prove there's no way to fully prevent adolescents from obtaining and using marijuana, legalization puts the sale of marijuana in state-licensed vendors who can be punished for selling to individuals under the age of 21.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marijuana is a gateway drug 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As far back as 1999, the National Academy of Sciences concluded: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ “In the sense that marijuana use typically precedes rather than follows initiation of other illicit drug use, it is indeed a ‘gateway’ drug. But because underage smoking and alcohol use typically precede marijuana use, marijuana is not the most common, and is rarely the first, ‘gateway’ to illicit drug use. There is no conclusive evidence that the drug effects of marijuana are causally linked to the subsequent abuse of other illicit drugs.”³⁴
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enforcement of marijuana prohibition is a necessary and just way to prevent drug use 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marijuana enforcement leads to racial injustice. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Although use among white citizens in Washington is slightly more than African Americans,³⁵ African-Americans are 3-times more likely to be arrested for possession.³⁶ • Marijuana abuse should be treated as a health issue and not a criminal offense.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There’s no way to prevent people from driving under the influence of marijuana 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In fact, this initiative makes driving under the influence of marijuana illegal if an individual has 5 ng/mL blood level of THC or more.³⁷

Although it is impossible to predict and address all objections, the campaign should familiarize itself with all available data on marijuana use in Washington State. To avoid giving the opposition tools to criticize the initiative, the campaign

should avoid messages that promote drug use or claim that there are no health risks or addictive qualities of marijuana. Instead, the campaign should control the message by focusing primarily on how the initiative will increase public safety, promote social order and increase revenue. Furthermore, if the message consists of appeals to individual rights and freedoms, it will be harder to emphasize the positive outcomes of legalization. Safety-themed messages in support of legalization will allow the campaign to preemptively address the more serious objections. Also, because the issue's solid supporters are liberals, Democrats, and young people (18-34), messages directed at these groups should be more about spreading awareness and mobilization rather than persuasion. Instead, persuasive campaign messages directed at women, minorities and libertarian-leaning conservatives and Republicans should emphasize the safety and order frame.

With all of this in mind, this plan proposes the following theme:

Initiative 100:

Safe, Smart, Sensible Reform

- **Safe:**
 - Initiative 100 creates a state-wide regulatory *system* to ensure safe production, distribution, sale and consumption of marijuana.
 - Initiative 100 takes the sale and production of marijuana out of the black market and money away from the violent criminals and gangs that profit from the illegal marijuana trade.

- **Smart:**

- Initiative 100 will prevent waste and abuse. Prohibition has done nothing to prevent the use of marijuana and has led to burdensome costs on the criminal justice system in the prosecution of non-violent drug offenders. Enforcement of marijuana laws has also led to racial disparities in the criminal justice system.
- Initiative 100 will stimulate the economy and increase revenue. Instead of wasting money on ineffective law enforcement, Initiative 100 will increase state revenue by taxing the sale and production of marijuana

- **Sensible:**

- Initiative 100 regulates marijuana in a similar manner to alcohol. It will be illegal for individuals under the age of 21 to purchase or consume marijuana.
- Initiative 100 prohibits driving under the influence of marijuana



V. Targeting and Polling Plan

A. Targeting

To review what has been established after looking at the political environment and public opinion data, below is the targeting strategy.

Demographic Targeting:

- Likely Supporters (Mobilization and Awareness Messages)
 - Young People (18-34)
 - Democrats
 - Liberals
- Persuadable Voters (Persuasive Messages):
 - Women
 - 35-49 Year Olds
 - African-Americans
 - Hispanics
 - Independents
 - Libertarian-leaning conservatives/Republicans
- Unlikely Voters
 - 65 and older
 - Conservative Republicans

Geographical Targeting:

- In terms of campaign resources, resources should be devoted to each region in the following manner:

- Puget Sound – 1/2 of campaign resources
- Southwestern – 3/8 of campaign resources (Mostly in King County/Pierce County Area)
- Eastern – 1/8 of campaign resources (Mostly in Spokane area)

B. Polling

Before the campaign submits its language for the initiative, it should conduct three polls in May, June and July of 2011 to test various initiative languages. Each poll should have a fairly large representative sample to gauge how targeted demographic groups will view the wording of the measure. The language that achieves the most support overall and among the targeted groups should be used in the final language of the initiative text to be submitted in August of 2011.

There are two types of polls that should be used during the campaign: benchmark and tracking. The Benchmark poll will be taken around August of 2012 to get a starting point for how targeted demographic groups view this issue. It should have a very large sample to get the most accurate measure. It should ask the respondent to indicate whether they Agree, Disagree or neither Agree nor Disagree with the following statement: “The state of Washington should legalize the use of marijuana for adults who are 21 years of age and older, regulate and license the sale and production of marijuana and amend the law to prohibit driving under the influence of marijuana.” This will set a baseline for all targeted groups for the outset of the campaign.

The campaign should conduct a large-scale tracking poll in September to measure support before the media plan begins. When the paid media plan is implemented, there should be two tracking polls throughout the month of October to measure change in opinion leading up to the election. These polls can use a smaller sample than the benchmark poll, which means a higher margin of error. However, it should give the campaign a good indication of how voters are responding to campaign messages and if any changes need to be made.

Looking at the amount spent on polling by the 2008 Yes on Initiative 1000 campaign dealing with physician-assisted suicide, the campaign can get a sense of about how much each poll will cost.³⁸ The Yes on I-1000 campaign spent around \$8,000 to \$20,000 per poll during the 2008 election. There also might be organizations willing to conduct polls as an in-kind contribution or perhaps it might be worth it to add a question about this issue to another prominent poll being conducted, if the poll is reputable. To be safe, the campaign should project about \$12,000 for the three language-based polls, \$48,000 for the initial benchmark poll, \$24,000 for the first tracking poll and \$12,000 for each additional tracking poll. In all, the campaign should expect to spend at least \$132,000 on polling. Because the campaign will not be spending money on traditional get-out-the-vote efforts, it should spend more money on opinion research by ensuring large samples and scientific results.

VI. Voter Contact Plan

A. Earned Media

For this campaign, it will be extremely important to reach voters through “free” media, or attention given to the issue and campaign by way of news coverage. This can be accomplished through sending press releases for major events to the campaign, holding press conferences or encouraging rallies at the state capitol in favor of the initiative. The campaign should attempt to gain media coverage when the campaign files the initiative, signature gathering efforts, when the legislature debates the initiative, when it is officially placed on the ballot, prominent endorsements and, of course, coverage of polls leading up to election day. Also, given the newsworthiness of a state attempting to legalize marijuana, states in which a legalization measure is on the ballot will likely also receive national news coverage.

Below is a list of major media outlets in Washington State to which the campaign should send media advisories when events occur. The campaign should also note that average circulation can change depending on the day of the week.

Table 5.1 Top Newspapers in Washington State by Circulation

(Rounded to the Nearest Hundred)⁸⁹

Name	County	Daily Circ.	Sat. Circ.	Sun Circ.
Seattle Times	King	221,700	203,900	343,900
The News Tribune	Pierce	74,800	72,200	97,900
Spokesman Review	Spokane	65,800	75,600	48,500
The Columbian	Clark	46,200	29,600	50,300
The Daily Herald	Snohomish	41,800	40,700	N/A
The Olympian	Thurston	21,900	22,500	27,000

The campaign should also be aware of the local television stations in targeted areas, particularly prominent stations (CBS, ABC, NBC and Fox) in the Seattle/Tacoma area (KOMO-TV, KING-TV, KIRO-TV, KCPQ) and Spokane (KREM, KXLY-TV, KHQ-TV, KAYU-TV).

Media can also be earned through prominent endorsements. Below is a list of examples of organizations and individuals from which to seek for endorsements.

Table 5.2 Organizations from Which to Seek Endorsements

Organization	Description	Website/Contact
Washington State Democratic Party	State-wide Democratic Party, which has endorsed previous marijuana legalization efforts	http://www.wa-democrats.org/
Washington County Democratic Party Organizations	39 Separate County Party Organizations, some of which might sway persuadable voters in their district	http://wa-demchairs.org/blog/counties
Washington Legislative District Democratic Party Organizations	There are 49 Legislative District Organizations	http://www.wa-democrats.org/content/legislative-district-org
ACLU of Washington	The ACLU of Washington has been a prominent advocate of marijuana reform	http://www.aclu-wa.org/
Washington NORML	National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws	http://www.wanorml.org/
Law Enforcement Against Prohibition	National organization of former and current members of law enforcement who support legalization	http://www.leap.cc/
NAACP of Washington	Although not a sure supporter, the California NAACP backed Prop. 19. Should help gain support among minority voters hesitant to legalization	http://www.naacpaowsac.org/

Table 5.3 Individuals from Which to Seek Endorsements

Individual	Description/Website
U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D)	http://www.cantwell.senate.gov/public/
U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D)	http://www.murray.senate.gov/public/
U.S. Representatives	http://www.house.gov/representatives/#state_wa
Washington State Representatives	Contact all members of the state House of Representatives to seek endorsements. http://www.leg.wa.gov/house/representatives/Pages/default.aspx
Washington State Senators	Contact all members of state Senators http://www.leg.wa.gov/Senate/Senators/Pages/default.aspx
Local Officials, such as Mayors and City Council Members	Local support might help persuade some citizens who are hesitant to legalized drugs
Norm Stamper	Retired Seattle Chief of Police and outspoken advocate for drug reform http://www.leap.cc/author/Norm/
Gary Johnson	Former Governor of New Mexico and likely 2012 Libertarian presidential candidate

The campaign should also reach out to other law enforcement, physicians, health and medical organizations and former public officials around the state. It is doubtful that U.S. senators or representatives from Washington will lend support given the political issues involved in supporting such a measure on a national stage, but it does not hurt to try. The more prominent endorsements the initiative receives, the more the issue will be legitimized to voters who are hesitant to supporting the measure.

Below are two sample press releases that the campaign would employ to announce the filing of the initiative and the successful gathering of signatures to place the initiative on the ballot. These releases should be sent to as many outlets as possible to garner earned media attention.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

August 4, 2011

Contact: Communications Director/ (555) - 555 - 5555
communications@citizensforsensiblereformwa.org

Citizen Group Files Popular Initiative to Legalize Marijuana

Washington Citizens for Sensible Reform seeks to place marijuana legalization measure on the ballot for the November 6, 2012 General Election

OLYMPIA – In response to growing public support and recent discussion by the state legislature, Citizens for Sensible Reform filed an initiative with the Washington State Legislature in an effort to reform Washington’s marijuana laws. This measure will be brought before the voters to decide in the November 6, 2012 General Election.

The proposed initiative would implement the following reforms:

- Remove state criminal and civil penalties for the sale, production, possession and use of marijuana;
- Approve the licensing and regulation of the above activities;
- Create a state-wide regulatory body to create rules, regulations and licensing requirements;
- Create a legal limit of 21 years of age for the purchase and use of marijuana;
- Amend state DUI laws to include a maximum THC blood content;
- Provide for the taxation of marijuana sales;
- And allocate revenue from these taxes to the state’s general fund, drug-prevention programs and other drug awareness projects

The state legislature can adopt the initiative as submitted as law, it can approve an alternative initiative to be placed on the ballot alongside the original version, or, most likely, the legislature will take no action and the initiative will appear on the ballot in November if the necessary signatures are gathered.

Now that the petition has been submitted, Citizens for Sensible Reform must collect nearly 241,000 signatures by the end of December in order to qualify for the November 2012 General Election ballot.

As John Doe, the group’s spokesperson, recently said, “The initiative offers the people of Washington a smart, safe and sensible solution to the problems related to drug prohibition.”

A poll conducted last year found that 52 percent of Washingtonians supported the removal of civil and criminal penalties for the possession of marijuana. Legalization efforts have also recently received endorsements from the Seattle Times and the Washington State Democratic Party.

As long-time State Representative Mary Loud Dickerson, D – Seattle, asked, “Why shouldn’t Washington reap the benefits of legalization?”

For more information about Citizens for Sensible Reform, visit <http://sensiblereformwa.org> .

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

December 20, 2011

Contact: Communications Director/ (555) - 555 - 5555
communications@citizensforsensiblereformwa.org

Voters Will Decide Marijuana Ballot Initiative

Washington Citizens for Sensible Reform gather enough signatures to place measure to legalize, regulate and tax marijuana on the ballot for the November 6, 2012 General Election

OLYMPIA – With about 2 weeks before the deadline, Citizens for Sensible Reform submitted formal petitions with over 300,000 signatures to place a measure that would legalize, regulate and tax marijuana in the state of Washington on the ballot for the 2012 election. If approved by the voters, Initiative 100 would create safe, smart and sensible rules and regulations for the sale, production, possession and use of marijuana in the state.

The citizens of the state of Washington will greatly benefit from the legalization of marijuana. Initiative 100 will:

- Create a state-wide regulatory system to ensure the safe production, distribution, sale and consumption of marijuana
- Remove the sale and production of marijuana from black market and money away from the violent criminals and gangs that profit from the illegal marijuana trade.
- Prevent the burdensome costs on the criminal justice system in the prosecution of non-violent drug offenders and reduce the racial disparities in the criminal justice system.
- Stimulate the economy, increase revenue for the state and create funds for drug awareness and addiction programs.
- Regulate alcohol in a similar manner to alcohol by limiting the sale and use to adults who are 21 years of age and older
- Amend DUI laws to include a maximum level of THC

A poll conducted last year found that a majority of citizens supported the legalization of marijuana in Washington State. Initiative 100 has also been endorsed by Law Enforcement Against Prohibition, the ACLU of Washington, Retired Seattle Chief of Police Norm Stamper, former Governor of New Mexico Gary Johnson, and the Washington State Democratic Party, among others.

More and more, people are saying that it's time for adults in Washington to be able to safely and responsibly use marijuana.

For more information about Citizens for Sensible Reform, visit <http://sensiblereformwa.org>, like us on Facebook at [facebook.com/sensiblereformwa](https://www.facebook.com/sensiblereformwa) and follow us on twitter: @sensiblereformwa

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B. Paid Media

Since this campaign will likely have limited human resources and volunteers, the main form of paid voter contact will come through advertisements that saturate media markets in targeted areas, specifically the Puget Sound and Southwestern portions of the state as well some areas in the East, such as Spokane. This campaign will run two radio advertisements, one which explains the regulations and legal aspects of the initiative and one that features endorsements by law enforcement officers. The campaign will also run three types of television advertisements:

1. The first type of ads will feature middle-aged women with children in various locations discussing the merits of I-502. They will be structured around the main campaign's theme: Safe, Smart, Sensible Reform. To appeal to minority groups, the women in each ad should represent a different race. Sample scripts for these advertisements are included below.
2. The second type will feature current and former law enforcement officials discussing why they support the initiative. They will stress how current drug prohibition actually keeps us less safe and cite statistics of prohibition-related crime and incarceration.
3. The final set of ads will be shown in the last week or so leading up to the election. They will be mostly text-based spot that points out the key features of the law, using the Safe, Smart and Sensible messages. They

will also be used to remind young voters how to fill out their ballots, how to mail them in and how easy it is to vote. They can also be used as a way to respond to criticism from opposition groups.

Sample Script of Television Advertisement #1

Scene: *Woman 1 watching a soccer game*

Woman 1: I'm ready for SAFE reform that takes the sale of marijuana off the streets, out of the hands of criminals and puts responsible, state-licensed and regulated businesses in control.

Scene: *Woman 2 dropping her teenagers off at school*

Woman 2: I'm ready for SMART reform that stops putting our young people in jail for non-violent offenses and starts raising money to treat drug abuse and addiction as a health problem.

Scene: *Woman 3 standing in front yard while her kids play in the background*

Woman 3: I'm ready for SENSIBLE reform that creates a legal age-limit of 21, prevents driving under the influence and regulates marijuana like alcohol.

All Women: I'm ready to vote YES on Initiative one-hundred.

To get an estimate of how much money these advertisements will cost to run, we can look at another controversial ballot initiative from the 2008 election, Initiative 1000.⁴⁰ This initiative sought to legalize assisted suicide in the state of

Washington. According to Ballotpedia.org, this campaign ran both radio spots and produced three television advertisements.⁴¹

According to the Washington Public Disclosure Commission, the Yes on Initiative 1000 campaign used Fletcher Rowley Chao Riddle, Inc., a media consulting firm, to run its ad buy campaign. On September 29, 2008, the campaign paid FRCR \$218,350 to run the first set of ads, primarily on Seattle/Tacoma TV and radio stations. A month before the election, the campaign paid FRCR \$567,558 for a media buy the firm placed on October 3, 2008. On October 10, 2008, the campaign paid FRCR to make a \$544,238 buy three weeks before the election. On October 16th, the campaign paid FRCR to make another buy that cost \$731,640. Finally, the media company placed one last buy around the week of October 24, which cost the campaign \$760,393. In all, the campaign spent \$2,822,179 on advertising. The campaign also spent close to \$50,000 on producing their television spots.

Not only does the campaign spend more money in more areas the closer it gets to the election, but it also buys more ad-space. Using this campaign as a model and anticipating that the costs of buying ad space has increased in the last 4 years, we can estimate the following costs of this campaign's advertising strategy. The big buys will begin on October 19, about 18 days before the election when ballots are mailed.

Table 5.3 Advertising Schedule and Estimated Cost

Date	Location	Ad Type	Cost
Sept. 30 – Oct. 6	Seattle/Tacoma	Women, Law Enforcement	\$250,000
	Spokane	Law Enforcement	\$100,000
Oct. 6 – Oct. 12	Puget Sound	Radio, Women, Law Enforcement	\$400,000
	Spokane	Women, Law Enforcement	\$200,000
Oct. 12 – Oct 19	Puget Sound and Southwest	Radio, Women, Law Enforcement	\$550,000
	Spokane	Radio, Women, Law Enforcement	\$250,000
Oct. 19 – Oct. 26	Puget Sound and Southwest	Radio, Women, Law Enforcement, “How to Vote”	\$550,000
	Spokane	Radio, Women, Law Enforcement, “How to Vote”	\$250,000
Oct. 26 – Nov 6	Puget Sound, Southwest and East (Primarily Spokane)	Radio, Women, Law Enforcement and “How to Vote”	\$1,750,000
	TOTAL		\$4,300,000

Although these figures provide a rough estimate of cost to develop an effective media strategy, the campaign should hire a professional media consulting agency to help with production and the tactical media buys.

All television ads should play on local channels during morning and nightly news broadcasts and the radio ads should always be placed during morning and

evening drive-time. For television, ads featuring women should be played during soap operas, morning news talk programs like Good Day America, talk shows like The View, Lifetime movies and the cable news stations. Most of the ads featuring law enforcement should be placed at later times to catch working families, middle-aged men and minorities. They should play during reality TV shows and nightly network news broadcasts. A smaller amount of the ads featuring law enforcement should also appear on the morning news, but also day-time talk shows, court shows and day-time game shows. The “how-to-vote” ads should be placed during prime-time slots and on channels like MTV, Comedy Central and the CW.

The majority of the law enforcement radio ads should be played on radio stations that feature oldies, soft rock, Top-40, sports talk radio, R&B, hip-hop and some news talk radio. The information-based radio ads should play closer to Election Day and be placed on stations featuring Top-40, hip-hop, R&B and mainstream country. To determine the best rates and placement, the campaign should work closely with the ad buying agency to ensure that the right message reaches the right audience.

C. Social Media

For an initiative dealing with an issue strongly supported and advocated by young people, one cannot ignore the Internet or social media. Therefore, this campaign should ensure that it has a functional website and a presence on various social media outlets. To maintain a uniform, searchable brand, the website and all social media should use the name: “sensiblereformwa.” The website will be

<http://sensiblereformwa.org>. The website should include a button where people can donate to the campaign, a page where people can read about the initiative and how it will change the law, a page with resources and links to studies explaining the benefits of legalization, a page about news and press releases, a page for endorsements, a page where people can watch the campaign advertisements and other videos, and a form where people can volunteer for the campaign.

The title of the Facebook page should be “Yes on Initiative 100” so that when fans “like” the page, their friends and followers will see that this person liked and supported a ballot initiative. The page should be searchable as [facebook.com/sensiblereformwa](https://www.facebook.com/sensiblereformwa). On Twitter, the handle should be @sensiblereformwa. The profile picture should be the campaign’s logo so that each time a tweet is sent, “Yes on I-100” appears on someone’s Twitter homepage.

Here are a few brief suggestions for both Facebook and Twitter. There should be no posts or images depicting pot leaves, people getting high, references to people getting high, stories promoting drug use or articles suggesting that marijuana is not addicting or harmful. These pages should maintain the same message as the rest of the campaign – that Initiative 100 will create a safer legal and regulatory environment in Washington and that the best way to promote this safety is to end prohibition. The campaign should also hire someone to actively update all social media outlets, even ones not discussed here like YouTube. Unless there is someone who can constantly interact with supporters, it will be extremely difficult to grow followers and spread the message through these channels.

Finally, the campaign should be aware and in contact with two prominent political blogs in the region. The first one, The *NW Daily Marker*, “is a journal of current events in politics and culture important to the people of the Pacific Northwest.”⁴² While the *NW Daily Marker* attests to having higher journalistic standards, the blog *Northwest Progressive Institute Advocate* is slightly more left-leaning.⁴³ The *NPI Advocate* has been around since 2004 and will likely have considerable influence on progressive politicians in the state that will support this initiative. The campaign should also pay attention to blogs run by traditional media, such as the *Seattle Times’ Politics Northwest*⁴⁴ or *The News Tribune’s Political Buzz*.⁴⁵ These blogs will likely offer more in depth detail about the politics and status of the initiative as the campaign progresses.

Finance

VII. Fundraising Plan

Most of the resources in this campaign will be devoted to signature gathering and the media strategy. Therefore, this campaign needs to bring in at least \$6 million. To develop a fundraising plan, the campaign can start off by looking at financial data from California's 2010 marijuana legalization Proposition 19.⁴⁶ Overall, supporters of the measure generated over \$4.6 million in donations. One of the biggest supporters was Drug Policy Action. It donated nearly \$350,000 to Proposition 19 campaign committees and has donated to other marijuana-related reforms across the country.

There were, however, some large donations from individuals outside of the state of California. Prominent progressive philanthropist George Soros contributed \$1,000,000 to the measure. Peter Lewis, chairman of the Progressive Insurance Company, from Avon Lake, Ohio donated about \$210,000 to groups supporting the initiative. Lewis has been heavily involved in promoting marijuana policy nationwide. According to CNBC, Lewis is the head of the board for the Marijuana Policy Project.⁴⁷ In 2010, the organization contributed \$578,606 to a medical marijuana initiative in Arizona.⁴⁸ In 2008, the MPP contributed \$1.98 million to a medical marijuana initiative in Michigan and \$1,068,156 to a decriminalization measure in Massachusetts.⁴⁹ Although it is unclear why the MPP did not give to Proposition 19, Lewis and the MPP should both be asked to give contributions.

Other large "outside" donors from the Proposition 19 campaign included Philip D. Harvey from Chapel Hill, NC who donated \$100,000, Sean Parker from

Herndon, VA who contributed \$100,000 and Susan Pritzker from Chicago, IL who gave \$20,000.⁵⁰ Besides groups such as Drug Policy Action and the Marijuana Policy Project, the Drug Policy Alliance has given \$706,900 to ballot measures since 2003.⁵¹ Another group from which to seek contributions is the ACLU of Washington, which as noted earlier, has indicated strong support for marijuana legalization. The organization also donated \$61,536 to the assisted suicide legalization measure Initiative 1000 in 2008.⁵²

Finally, the campaign will also have a list of over 250,000 registered voters in the state of Washington after its signature gathering drive. These petitions include voters' addresses, which the campaign can use to send mailers asking for donations. These mailers should ask for about \$50, but should include suggested donations ranging from \$10 to even \$1,000 or more. The mailer should include a rip-off tab at the bottom and a return envelope. The campaign should send a mail piece immediately after the campaign reaches the necessary signatures to qualify for the ballot to thank the petition signer and ask for a donation. It should also send one in late September, asking recipients to help the campaign make a final push. If 10,000 of the recipients donate an average of \$50 for each letter, that could mean \$1 million.

The campaign should seek between \$2 million to \$2.5 million from Peter Lewis and/or the Marijuana Policy Project. Based on the stricter language of the initiative, public opinion and the political environment of Washington State, the initiative has an even better chance to pass than in California. Lewis has been

working for a long time for marijuana reform and will hopefully want to have a huge stake in making reform a reality in Washington. The campaign should also use the resources of Drug Policy Action and/or the Drug Policy Alliance, which have helped campaigns in the past raise money. Aid from either group should be used to generate between \$1 million to \$2 million. George Soros might also be willing to donate \$1 million to the campaign as well. The remainder of the contributions should come from individuals, Political Action Committees and policy organizations like the ACLU of Washington. The campaign should also reach out to health care providers and state-wide medical organizations as well as lawyers and law enforcement organizations that have been receptive to legalization.

Table 6. Fundraising Timeline

Contributor	Mar. 2011	Apr. 2011	Aug. 2011	May-Jul. 2012	Aug. 2012	Sep. 2012	TOTALS
George Soros	125,000	125,000	-	-	-	-	\$250,000
Peter Lewis	125,000	125,000	1,000,000	750,000	250,000	250,000	\$2,500,000
Marijuana Policy Project	-	-	-	250,000	250,000	500,000	\$1,000,000
Drug Policy Action	-	-	-	-	200,000	600,000	\$800,000
Drug Policy Alliance	-	-	-	-	200,000	200,000	\$400,000
ACLU - WA	-	-	-	-	-	100,000	\$100,000
Other Individual Contributions	-	-	-	300,000	450,000	200,000	\$950,000
TOTAL	250,000	250,000	1,000,000	1,300,000	1,350,000	1,850,000	\$6,000,000

IX. Timeline and Preliminary Budget

Figure 11. Campaign Timeline

Month-Year	May-11	Jun-11	Jul-11	Aug-11	Sep-11	Oct-11	Nov-11	Dec-11	Jan-12	Feb-12	Mar-12	Apr-12	May-12	Jun-12	Jul-12	Aug-12	Sep-12	Oct-12						6-Nov-12	
Week (Begins With)																		1	8	15	22	29			
Opinion Research	■	■	■																						
Benchmark Poll																■									
Tracking Poll																	■			■		■			
Filing				■																					
Signature Gathering					■	■	■	■																	
Submit Signatures									■																
Seek Endorsements									■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Fundraising	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Press Releases				■				■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Press Conferences									■							■		■				■			
Advertising in Seattle																		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Advertising in Puget Sound																			■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Advertising in Southwest																					■	■	■	■	■
Advertising in East (Spokane Area)																						■	■	■	■
Election Day																								■	

Table 7.1 Preliminary Budget May 2011 – Jan 2012

Item	May 2011	Jun. 2011	July 2011	Aug. 2011	Sep. 2011	Oct. 2011	Nov. 2011	Dec. 2011	Jan. 2012
Office									
Rent	3,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000
Phone	100	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Office Supplies	1,000	50	50	50	50	50	50	1,000	1,000
Utilities	300	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150
Computer/ Internet	2,000	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Signature Gathering	-	-	-	-	500,000	300,000	150,000	50,000	-
Polling	12,000	12,000	12,000	-	-	-	-	-	-
Staff									
Manager	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000
Other Staff	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
Total	27,400	23,300	23,300	11,300	511,300	311,300	161,300	62,250	12,250
Cumulative		50,700	74,000	85,300	596,600	907,900	1,069,200	1,131,450	1,143,700

Table 7.2 Preliminary Budget Feb. 2012 – Nov. 2012

Item	Feb. 2012	Mar. 2012	Apr. 2012	May 2012	Jun. 2012	July 2012	Aug. 2012	Sep. 2012	Oct. 2012 – Nov 6.
Office									
Rent	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	4,000
Phone	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	100
Office Supplies	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	1,000	100
Materials for Volunteers	-	-	-	-	-	-	600	600	600
Utilities	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	300
Travel	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,000	2,000	4,000
Website/ Upkeep	-	-	-	1,000	100	100	100	100	200
Printing	1,000	1,000	1,000	5,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	20,000	20,000
Literature	-	10,000	-	-	-	-	30,000	-	-
Computer/ Internet	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	1,000	50
Signs									
Yard Signs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,000	-
Signs and Banners	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,000	-
Photography	-	-	-	1,000	-	-	-	1,000	-
TV/Radio Advertising	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.3 mil
Polling	-	-	-	-	-	-	48,000	24,000	24,000
Fundraising									
Mail/Postage	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	20,000	20,000	1,000	5,000
Paid Phone Calls	-	-	-	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	10,000
Staff									
Consultants	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	In-Kind
Manager	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	8,000
Other Staff	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	15,000
Total	13,300	23,300	13,300	24,300	27,400	46,400	127,000	76,900	4,391,350
Cumulative	1,157,000	1,180,300	1,193,600	1,217,900	1,245,300	1,291,700	1,418,700	1,495,600	5,886,950

Table 7.3 Total Estimated Budget

Item	Estimated Cost
Office	
Rent	\$39,000
Phone	\$1,000
Office Supplies	\$4,750
Materials for Volunteers	\$1,800
Utilities	\$3,000
Travel	\$8,000
Website/ Upkeep	\$1,600
Printing	\$78,000
Literature	\$40,000
Computer/ Internet	\$3,800
Signature Gathering	\$1,000,000
Signs	
Yard Signs	\$5,000
Signs and Banners	\$5,000
Photography	\$2,000
TV/Radio Advertising	\$4,300,000
Polling	\$132,000
Fundraising	
Mail/Postage	\$51,000
Paid Phone Calls	\$35,000
Staff	
Consultants	In-Kind
Manager	\$76,000
Other Staff	\$100,000
Total Expenses:	\$5,886,950
Total Income:	\$6,000,000
Funds Available (Cash Flow):	+\$113,050

Evaluation of Campaign

Once the election is over, the campaign will have various tools to measure its success or failure beyond how many votes the initiative received on Election Day. Indeed, the plan is centered on increasing support among certain targeted groups like women, minorities and voters between the ages of 35 and 49 as well as mobilizing peripheral voters like young people and independents to not only vote, but to vote for this initiative. To measure attitude and behavioral change, the campaign will have poll numbers from its benchmark poll and its tracking polls throughout the campaign. These can be used to see whether support among targeted groups increased and whether one's likelihood to vote for the initiative increased.

The campaign will also be able to look at exit polls for after the campaign to get an idea of how much support it received from the various targeted demographic groups on Election Day. Finally, the campaign can look at a county-by-county breakdown to see if targeted groups increased influence in different regions of the state. It is important to note that the campaign cannot make any causal links between increased or decreased support and its advertising, its media coverage, its endorsements or other forms of voter contact. Increased support from some groups might have nothing at all to do with the campaign, itself. Regardless, these measures can give the campaign a good idea about its overall effectiveness.

Conclusion

This plan has devised a starting point for the campaign and can be amended as needed. Using an inverted pyramid approach, the literature review in Part I and the analysis of Washington's political environment serves as the foundation for the entire strategy. The analysis of the political environment provides insights into how support from public officials, the actions of political parties and overall public opinion can shape how the campaign develops its message. The reliance on the safety and order frame stems from both the groups the environmental analysis indicates should be targeted and persuaded as well as how studies discussed in the literature review address the issue of framing. The plan to seek endorsements from the Democratic Party and prominent Democratic legislators stems from the targeting plan and from studies dealing with the effects of turnout on the Democratic vote. The voter contact plan is not only driven by the development of the message, but also by previous research dealing with source cues and credibility.

Finally, the fundraising and budget plans are based on this overall messaging, targeting and communications strategy and are probably the most flexible sections of the campaign. For instance, if the campaign cannot raise enough money to run a robust advertising campaign, then this plan provides the overriding strategy from which to develop appropriate changes that keep the campaign on an effective message. The polling plan provides tools to measure the success and failure of messaging strategies and could determine whether one advertisement is more or less effective than the other. The campaign plan provides a roadmap to

winning this election but leaves room for detours to be made, if needed. However, if Citizens for Sensible Reform uses this as its guide, it should find success on Election Day.

Notes

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